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RATIONALIZING A DECADE OF JUDICIAL
RESPONSES TO EXCULPATORY CLAUSES
Anita Cava*
Don Wiesner**
Now Pilate, seeing that he was doing no good, but rather a riot
was breaking out, took water and washed his hands in sight of
the crowd, saying, "I am innocent of the blood of this just man;
see to it yourselves." And all the people answered and said,
"His blood be on us and on our children."'
Pontius Pilate's non mea culpa qualifies as a famous attempt to
excuse the effects of behavior, As Fifth Procurator of Judea, Pilate
was bound by a duty to punish the guilty and protect the innocent. If
he failed to act reasonably in performing either of those acts, he was
accountable for the consequences. However, others could bargain to
assume responsibility for those consequences, as did the people of
Judea in the example reported by Matthew above."
Pilate's "bargain" with his subjects simulates modern contracts
which contain promises known as "exculpatory clauses." An excul-
patory clause is a provision in a bargain that excuses a party from
some duty. This article is the result of a review of 204 of the past
decade's judicial decisions involving explicit exculpatory clauses.'
The review was undertaken to identify the exculpatory clause in its
environment and to analyze the rationales supporting or denying its
efficacy.
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1. Matthew 27:24, 25.
2. Pilate's motivation in this matter is somewhat explained by his dilemma as a foreign
viceroy. He had been reported to Rome so frequently that he feared to be reported again for
not suppressing a revolt against the emperor. Pilate also failed as a representative of justice, for
he condemned Jesus to death after declaring Jesus innocent for the fourth time.
3. The authors have confined their analysis to explicit exculpatory clauses and thus treat
indemnification clauses only peripherally. For an inquiry into the difficulties posed by these
two related but very different contractual clauses, see Comment, Indemnity and Exculpation:
Circle of Confusion in the Courts, 33 EMORY L.J. 135 (1984).
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Exculpatory clauses are examined here in reference to the obli-
gation to not commit negligence while performing a contract. This
duty is authorized by legal implication and derives from the judicial
practice of supplying missing terms or natural premises in contracts.
For example, there is a line of breach of contract cases involving
accountants who broke no specific promise, but who were, neverthe-
less, held liable because they acted negligently in carrying out their
responsibilities."
This article discusses exculpatory clauses in two contexts. First,
it reviews cases where exculpatory clauses were vulnerable to judi-
cial interpretation. Second, the article discusses cases where exculpa-
tory clauses have been upheld as viable.
I. VULNERABILITY OF EXCULPATORY CLAUSES
Exculpatory clauses appear vulnerable to strict judicial stan-
dards of interpretation. When examining exculpatory clauses, courts
police: (1) the technical formation of the contract, i.e., the offer and
acceptance; (2) the status or position of the parties to the bargain;
and (3) public policy concerns. Corbin summarizes these practices
when he proposes that "those who are not engaged in a public ser-
vice may properly bargain against liability for harm caused by their
ordinary negligence in performance of contractual duty."'
Evaluating Pilate's behavior under these standards requires not
only an examination of the public policy considerations that arise
when a ruler absolves himself of negligence in ruling his subjects,
but also a test to determine whether Pilate's "people" entered into an
informed bargain. This latter test requires the application of such
monitoring agents as the simple mutual assent doctrine and such le-
gal principles that protect those of unequal bargaining power, a nor-
mally inadequate ground for relief from a contractual commitment.
Pilate's statement fails the examination on all grounds. First,
rulers owe the highest duty to their public and have no right to bar-
gain away their power. Hence, Pilate's statement was contrary to the
4. "[A]ccompanying every contract is a common-law duty to perform with care, skill,
reasonable expediency, and faithfulness the thing agreed to be done. A negligent failure to
observe any of these conditions is a tort as well as a breach of contract." Lincoln Grain, Inc. v.
Coopers & Lybrand, 216 Neb. 433, 437, 345 N.W.2d 300, 305 (1984). See also Blumberg v.
Touche Ross & Co., 514 So. 2d 922, 924-27 (Ala. 1987), in which a letter promising an
examination of the balance sheet "in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards"
was held to create a duty of care and liability in both tort and contract if not so executed.
5. 6A A. CORBIN, A COMPREHENSIVE TREATISE ON THE WORKING RULES OF CON-
TRACr LAW § 1472, at 591, 596 (1963 & Supp. 1984).
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public interest. Second, it is unlikely that Pilate's subjects manifested
their consent to the bargain in a manner that would satisfy contrac-
tual requirements. Whether the people of Judea were well-informed
of the ramifications of their promise to assume liability for Pilate's
wrongs is doubtful. The political and mob-like environment detailed
in the Gospel probably diminished the people's ability to appreciate
the consequences of sending innocent people to their deaths. Even
more important, the people of Judea were hardly in an equal bar-
gaining position with Pilate.
Courts uphold exculpatory clauses only if simple negligence is
at issue.6 Evidence of gross negligence will always defeat an exculpa-
tory clause,' as will frauds and other intentional torts." Accordingly,
damages allegedly based on slanderous statements made by a former
employer in a recommendation could not be cleansed by a non mea
culpa clause relieving "all parties from all liability for any damage
6. "Simple negligence" is sometimes difficult to define. In South Carolina Elec. & Gas
Co. v. Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 322 S.E.2d 453, 458 (S.C. Ct. App. 1984), for example, the
court denied enforcement of a warranty disclaimer because it applied to negligence in manu-
facturing, but not to negligence in design. In addition, the doctrine of comparative negligence
can limit application of the clause. In Tate v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 647 P.2d 58,
60 (Wyo. 1982), a contractual provision limiting future liability to gross negligence was held
ineffective because it ran counter to the state's comparative negligence statute.
7. Kleartone Transparent Prods. Co. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 88 A.D.2d 353, 453
N.Y.S.2d 433 (1982) (alleged gross negligence in failing to report collection problems to ex-
tender of credit). See also Valuable Holding Corp. v. Midtown Vault Corp., 120 A.D.2d 356,
502 N.Y.S.2d 8 (1986) (loss of valuables in safe deposit box was not excused because employ-
ing a security guard knowing of his previous conversions is grossly negligent); Third Swansea
Properties, Inc. v. Ockerlund Constr. Co., 41 111. App. 3d 894, 354 N.E.2d 148 (1976) (excul-
patory clause held not applicable to willful and wanton misconduct evidenced by a welder's
failure to take precautions to avoid damage by fire).
8. Laudisio v. Amoco Oil Co., 108 Misc. 2d 245, 437 N.Y.S.2d 502 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1981) (exculpatory clause ruled effective against claims of negligence, but not against claims of
fraud or misrepresentation). Similarly, a charge of fraud made by a purchaser against a broker
based upon representations concerning utility services withstood an exculpation clause in the
contract which provided that the "[plurchaser is relying solely upon his own examination."
Sanfillipo v. Rarden, 24 Ohio App. 3d 164, 167, 493 N.E.2d 991, 995-96 (1985). But see
James v. Naumann, 464 So. 2d 1260 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), reh'g denied, 476 So. 2d 674 (Fla.
1985), also a fraud action against a seller of real estate based on alleged representations con-
cerning yield and future value. In that case, language in a sales agreement to the effect that the
buyer's decision to purchase was made on his "inspection and investigation" was held to insu-
late the seller from this cause of action. Id. at 1261.
9. A claim brought by a shipping company against a carrier for conversion could not be
defeated by an exculpatory clause because "fo]nce a conversion has been established, public
policy bars enforcement of liability and limitation." RGA Indus., Inc. v. Jomas Express, Inc.,
129 Misc. 2d 1066, 499 N.Y.S.2d 28 (N.Y. App. Term. 1985). See also Mankap Enters., Inc.
v. Wells Fargo Alarm Servs., Div. of Baker Protective Servs., Inc., 427 So. 2d 332, 333-34
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (exculpatory clause may not shield the intentional misrepresenta-
tion of features of an alarm system).
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that may result from furnishing same."10 The presence of accusa-
tions greater than negligence, therefore, affected the results of our
review. Some beneficiaries of exculpatory clauses lost because cau-
tious plaintiffs included a charge of gross negligence, or commission
of an intentional tort1" in their complaints.
The vulnerability of exculpatory clauses begins at the begin-
ning, in the formation stages of the contract.
A. Mutual Consent
The cases reviewed from the past decade confirm that bargains
containing exculpatory clauses do not benefit from the "freedom of
contract" doctrine. Courts critically examine both the conduct of the
parties manifesting assent to the bargain and the words describing
the excuse. For example, one court held ineffective a registration
form containing a release which did not refer to negligence and was
signed while the patient was reclining in the dentist's chair just prior
to treatment. 2 The court's language reflected its critical attitude to-
ward the clause:
While . . .the law grudgingly accepts the proposition that men
may contract away their liability for negligently caused injuries,
they may do so ...on the condition that their intention be
expressed clearly and in "unequivocal terms."18
10. Kellums v. Freight Sales Centers, Inc., 467 So. 2d 816, 817 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1985). The clause was also ineffective as against a charge of fraud. However, the court noted
that it might act "to absolve ... any liability for invasion of privacy or tortious interference
with a business relationship." Id. at 818.
11. See, e.g., Morgan v. South Cent. Bell Tel. Co., 466 So. 2d 107 (Ala. 1985) (proof of
fraud vitiates an otherwise enforceable exculpatory clause in favor of the telephone company);
Adams v. Roark, 686 S.W.2d 73, 76 (Tenn. 1985) (summary judgment in favor of a motorcy-
cle dragway.-was reversed to allow an injured plaintiff a chance to prove gross negligence);
Mankap Enters., 427 So. 2d at 332 (limitation of damages provision is unenforceable when
the jury determines that gross negligence existed); Douglas W. Randall, Inc. v. AFA Protective
Sys., Inc., 516 F. Supp. 1122, 1126 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
12. Abramowitz v. New York Univ. Dental Center, College of Dentistry, 110 A.D.2d
343, 494 N.Y.S.2d 721 (1985). Where the ritual of offer and acceptance reflects a genuine
agreement, the parties may be left where they stand or, as in Arbegast v. Board of Educ., 65
N.Y.2d 161, 480 N.E.2d 365, 490 N.Y.S.2d 751 (1985), where they fall. In Arbegast, plaintiff
student-teacher was injured while participating in a game of "donkey basketball." Her testi-
mony that she had been informed of the risks and had agreed to accept them defeated any
claims against defendant.
13. Abramowitz, 110 A.D.2d at 343, 494 N.Y.S.2d at 725 (citing Van Dyke Prods. v.
Eastman Kodak Co., 12 N.Y.2d 301, 305, 189 N.E.2d 693, 695, 239 N.Y.S.2d 337, 340
(1963)).
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1. Transaction Defects
To be enforceable, an exculpatory clause must initially succeed
as a contractual proposition. An otherwise valid clause will not be
upheld if the transaction between the parties was defective. For ex-
ample, setting out exculpatory language in small print on the bottom
of a report was fatal to a marine surveyor's claim that the purchaser
of a boat waived all claims of negligence against the surveyor. 4 The
court refused to enforce the clause notwithstanding the fact that the
clause was "clear and unambiguous" on its face" and even though
there was equal bargaining power between the parties:
It must be shown that [plaintiff] clearly and unequivocally
agreed to the disclaimer with knowledge of its content ...
There is no evidence the disclaimer was mentioned or bargained
for. . . [Plaintiff] did not see the exculpatory clause until he
read it in the survey report."
Similarly, an "unreadable" clause on the reverse side of an acknowl-
edgement order made by a well driller was not enforced against a
creamery when the latter sued the driller for negligent installation of
machinery. 7 An attempt to place an exculpatory clause in small
print in letterheads and billheads was also given short shrift."
The requirement that a party have "actual" notice of unex-
pected and unfavorable clauses is classically illustrated in Blanc v.
Windham Mountain Club." In that case, a ski club adopted by-laws
14. Krohnert v. Yacht Sys. Haw., Inc., 4 Haw. App. 190, 664 P.2d 738 (1983).
15. Id. at 200, 664 P.2d at 744-45.
16. Id.
17. McCarthy Well Co., Inc. v. St. Peter Creamery, 410 N.W.2d 312, 315 (Minn.
1987). The court left no doubt as to its distaste for defendant's contract.
What is fatal, however, is that the terms are printed on dark paper in tiny
print. The exculpatory section appears in the middle of this impenetrable text.
To read the terms and conditions with any degree of comprehension is difficult,
exceedingly tedious, and even physically painful. . . . [T]his is a case where a
party is not able to know what the contract terms are because they are unread-
able. As a matter of law, the exculpatory clause will not be enforced.
Id. at 316.
18. Sealand Indus. v. General Ship Repair, 530 F. Supp. 550 (Md. 1982). The weak-
ness of the language, a point treated in the next section, was also a ground for denying the
efficacy of the clause. Id. at 567.
19. 115 Misc. 2d 404, 406, 454 N.Y.S.2d 383, 388-89 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1982), affd, 92
A.D.2d 529, 459 N.Y.S.2d 447 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983). Concerning actual notice, consider A
& Z Appliances, Inc. v. Electric Burglar Alarm Co., 90 A.D.2d 802, 455 N.Y.S.2d 674
(1982), in which an alarm company's limitation of damages, almost uniformly enforced as
discussed in the text accompanying note 139 infra, was suspect because it appeared on the
reverse side of a single sheet contract and was not incorporated by reference on the face sheet.
The case was set for trial to determine whether the limitation "was not obscured ... as to
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containing a hold-harmless provision for injuries sustained while us-
ing the ski club facilities.20 A member and his wife were injured
while using a chairlift. They sued, alleging that an employee of the
club had been negligent. The court found the language of the release
"sufficiently clear and unambiguous," 1 but ruled that it could not be
enforced against either party on transactional grounds. The clause
was inapplicable against the member-husband because he had never
received a copy of the by-laws. The court stated, "the absence of
proper notification is crucial, since the viability of the defense is de-
pendent upon the consensual nature of the agreement to exonerate
one from liability for one's own negligence." 2 The clause was like-
wise unenforceable against the wife, who was not a member of the
club, knew nothing of the by-laws, and had never agreed to any club
rules.2"
make it probable that it would escape plaintiff's attention." Id. at 803, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 675.
Similarly, in Belger Cartage Serv., Inc. v. Holland Constr. Co., 224 Kan. 320, 582 P.2d
1111 (1978), a lessor's exculpatory clause did not protect him against the lessee's claims for
damages because the clause was not conspicuous and there was no evidence that anyone had
read it. The court in Della Corte v. Williston Park, 60 A.D.2d 639, 400 N.Y.S.2d 358 (1977),
raised the issue of notice in terms of the extent of the parties' understanding. There, defendant
engineer's inspection report may have been incomplete concerning water seepage. The court
remanded the case for more information on whether the contractual disclaimer had been con-
templated as being sufficient by the parties.
20. Under the terms of the clause, as a condition to membership in the ski club, each
member agreed "to hold the club harmless from claims of any kind, nature, or description
(including claims resulting from the negligence of an officer, employee, governor, or member of
the club), arising out of the use of any of the club's facilities by such member or the member's
family." Blanc v. Windham Mountain Club, 115 Misc. 2d 404, 406, 454 N.Y.S.2d 383, 385
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1982).
21. Id. at 408, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 387.
22. Id. at 409, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 388. After engaging in a thorough analysis of the lan-
guage and enforceability of the clause from a transactional point of view, the court indicated
that the clause would be unenforceable as a matter of public policy in New York. Id. at 410,
454 N.Y.S.2d at 389. See infra text accompanying notes 94-96, where statutory aspects of
public policy are discussed.
23. Id. at 410, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 389. The issue of the spouse's derivative claim is an
interesting facet of exculpatory clause cases. For example, Colton v. New York Hosp., 98
Misc. 2d 957, 414 N.Y.S.2d 866 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1979), involved an agreement signed by a
kidney transplant patient on the eve of the still experimental surgery. A medical malpractice
suit initiated following the patient's death required the court to construe the agreement. Hold-
ing that it was a covenant not to sue rather than a true exculpatory agreement, the court
enforced the agreement because the operation had been performed in a non-negligent manner.
As to the surviving spouse, the court said, "Itihe agreement, of course, cannot be held to bar
[her] claims, since she did not sign it. Insofar as her claims are derivative, however, they are
delimited by [the deceased husband's] claims, which are in turn delimited by the agreement."
Id. at 971, 414 N.Y.S.2d at 876.
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2. Language Used
The drafters of exculpatory clauses can never be quite sure that
the language they select will accomplish the desired goal. Generally,
scriveners of these clauses are allowed only one chance to create a
clause that will effectively limit liability for negligent acts. 24 As one
court stated, "[U]nless the intention of the parties is expressed in
unmistakable language, an exculpatory clause will not be deemed to
insulate a party from his own negligent acts."' 25 Consequently, in
Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Montagano,26 an apparently well-
drafted form termite agreement failed a termite company when a
subscriber of the company's extermination service selected a guaran-
tee on the first page of the agreement which contained a clause refer-
24. See, e.g., Parrino v. Royal Ins. Co., 484 So. 2d 282 (La. App. 1986) (a landlord-
tenant exculpation clause was ruled ambiguous and did not clearly release party); Salton Bay
Marina, Inc. v. Imperial Irrigation Dist., 172 Cal. App. 3d 914, 218 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1985)
(county's exculpatory clause concerning flooding was not only void as against public policy, but
also ambiguous, for it failed to state the type of flooding); Merritt v. Nationwide Warehouse
Co., 605 S.W.2d 250, 255 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1980), where language releasing the lessor of
warehouse storage space from liability "for damage to property caused by fire, water, or any
cause whatever" was declared unambiguous by a literal-minded court. The clause protected
against "damage only and not to loss as by theft." Id. See also Richard's 5 & 10, Inc. v.
Brooks Harvey Realty Investors, 264 Pa. Super. 384, 399 A.2d 1103 (1979) (reversing the
trial court's dismissal of plaintiff's claim because the clause was sufficiently ambiguous to war-
rant parole evidence).
25. 'Gross v. Sweet, 49 N.Y.2d 102, 106-07, 400 N.E.2d 306, 309, 424 N.Y.S.2d 365,
367-68 (1979). There, a release signed by a first-time parachute jumper was ineffective even
though the activity was not included in a statutory scheme declaring such clauses void in cer-
tain businesses. See infra note 94 and accompanying text. In Geise v. County of Niagara, 117
Misc. 2d 470, 458 N.Y.S.2d 162 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1983), involving a suit against a municipality
for injuries sustained while tobogganing, the failure to specifically mention "negligence" or
"fault" fatally infected the efficacy of the clause. The language used in the release, excusing
the municipality from "any liability for any harm, injury, damage ... including all risks,
whether foreseen or unforeseen," did not clearly alert the plaintiff to the shift in responsibility.
Id. at 472-73, 458 N.Y.S.2d at 164. But see Battig v. Hartford Acci. & Indem. Co., 482 F.
Supp. 338 (W.D. La.), aff'd, 608 F.2d 119 (5th Cir. 1979). Battig involved a suit against a
Catholic school by the parents of a child who died from a burst appendix. Despite the tragic
facts, the parents' allegations of negligence in failing to provide appropriate medical care did
not survive a summary judgment motion. A clause releasing the school "from any and all
liability of every nature," was effective, and the court specifically noted that the word "negli-
gence" was unnecessary. Id. at 344.
Some states have addressed this language issue by statute. See, e.g., Goyings v. Jack &
Ruth Eckerd Found., 403 So. 2d 1144 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981), where a Florida rule re-
quiring that "negligence" be specifically mentioned was relied upon to reverse summary judg-
ment in favor of a camp when a child suffered mental and physical injuries on a canoe trip.
The exculpatory clause providing "that reasonable precautions will be taken by Camp to as-
sure the safety and good health of said boy/girl but that Camp is not to be held liable in the
event of injury, illness or death..." was held to require a jury decision as to whether in fact
reasonable precautions had been taken. Id. at 1145-46.
26. 359 So. 2d 512 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
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ring the reader to terms listed on the back of the contract. As ex-
plained by the court:
There is not one word on this reverse side to indicate that the
paragraphs are not both applicable and that in actuality they
are intended to be in the alternative. Nor is there any explana-
tion as to which one applies in this instance. The sole "tip off"
as to what coverage really is, becomes apparent only when one
refers back to the applicable category boxes on the preceding
page of the agreement. 7
The Florida court refused to make this "referral" and instead
ordered the company to pay for termite damage caused by defective
eradication treatment.
Exculpatory clause language can also be challenged as lacking
in substantive intent. For example, in Anderson & Nafziger v. G.T.
Newcomb, Inc.,2" a clause which excused the seller of a crop sprin-
kler from responsibility for any crop losses caused by installation or
repair if the system failed. The court found that the buyer's crop loss
was occasioned by a "failure to make timely delivery" rather than by
defective installation or repair.29 The beneficiary of a clause in a
travel agency contract was no more fortunate. In Walton v. Fujita
Tourist Enters. Co.,80 a travel agent on a "familiarization trip" was
injured in a hotel. The travel agent alleged negligence by the party
providing and recommending the trip. The defendant joint venturers
pleaded that the contractual language declaring the providers "not
liable for any loss, damage or death"81 during the familiarization
trip should be read to absolve them of any liability. The court re-
jected the clause because it found the language to be "ambiguous in
scope." '
Some attempts to excuse contingent or unanticipated events via
generalized exculpatory clauses fared badly. Medical Operations
Management, Inc. v. National Health Laboratories, Inc." is in-
structive in this regard. There, a medical laboratory promised its
contractor to "comply with all state and federal regulations pertain-
27. Id. at 513.
28. 100 Idaho 175, 595 P.2d 709 (1979).
29. Id. at 181-82, 595 P.2d at 716.
30. 380 N.W.2d 198 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
31. Id. at 200.
32. Id. at 201. Language can be labeled "ambiguous" simply for failing to use magic
words. See supra note 24.
33. 176 Cal. App. 3d 886, 222 Cal. Rptr. 455 (1976).
[Vol. 28
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ing to clinical laboratories." 4 Difficulty arose when possible anti-
trust violations surfaced. In rejecting the argument that the language
of the contract immunized the parties from liability for noncompli-
ance with federal law, the court considered the distinction between
regulations affecting the operation of medical labs and laws concern-
ing competition in the marketplace. The parties, it held, did not in-
tend to impose on the defendant laboratory the "sole responsibility
for assuming the legality of the enterprise structure." 5
As in Anderson & Nafziger,s6 the drafter of the exculpatory
clause in Sea Land Industries, Inc. v. General Ship Repair Corp. 7
could not show a substantive connection between the anticipated
event as articulated and the event alleged to have taken place. In Sea
Land, the owners of a marine terminal sued a contractor who had
agreed to repair and maintain a crane. This large, land-based crane
was blown down the pier and damaged. Apparently, the contractor's
employee failed to secure the crane and left it unattended following
its use. A thunderstorm suddenly hit the area and a high wind blew
the unsecured crane down its tracks. The crane collided with the
concrete stops at the seaward end of the pier, causing extensive
damage.
The court's comments regarding the exculpatory clause at issue
illustrate a persistent judicial concern with assessing the specific risks
contemplated by the parties to a contract containing an exculpatory
clause. Addressing the weakness of the clause language in relation to
the risk realized, the court noted that on its face the clause was in-
tended to apply only to ship repair work and not to the type of work
performed by General Ship for the plaintiff Sea Land. The court
stated, "The word 'vessel' is used throughout. . . . A mere reading
of the language in question would indicate that it did not fit the
work being performed by General Ship for Sea Land but was in-
tended to. cover only ship repair work."3"
Unfortunately, judicial concern for a drafter's anticipation of
events to occur during the performance of a contract raises the pro-
34. Id. at 890, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 458.
35. Id. at 895, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 466.
36. 100 Idaho at 175, 595 P.2d at 709. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
37. 530 F. Supp. 550 (Md. 1982).
38. Id. at 567. See also, Johnson v. Mobil Oil Corp., 415 F. Supp. 264 (E.D. Mich.
1976). There a suit against Mobil Oil brought by a service station owner whose business was
destroyed by a fire allegedly caused by a delivery of contaminated gas. Mobil's motion for
summary judgment on the basis of a limitation of consequential damages clause was denied
because the court was concerned whether an uneducated plaintiff understood the force and
effect of the clause.
19881
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verbial hard case. Imagine drafting a clause for an auto race. How
specifically should the tragedy be described? The clause reviewed in
Arnold v. Shwano County Agriculture Society, 9 may be instructive.
There, a raceway attempted to deny recovery to a brain damaged
race-car driver via an exculpatory clause. The plaintiff alleged that
his injury resulted from the toxic fire extinguishing chemicals used
in rescuing him from his burning car. The Supreme Court of Wis-
consin reasoned that the release excused certain conditions contem-
plated by the parties, such as a negligently maintained track and
even the negligent driving of another participant. However, the
clause did not cover a negligent rescue operation.4
Thus, exculpatory clauses are vulnerable to judicial scrutiny of
the agreement between the parties. Failure to conspicuously and
clearly delineate the operation of a clause can render it unenforce-
able. Yet, successfully employing these precautionary measures is no
guarantee of success. Courts further patrol enforcement of the clause
by examining the bargaining process itself.
B. Bargaining Power
We are all equal under the law, although some of us are more
equal than others.41 As will be seen, insurance companies as subro-
gees in risk assignments and beneficiaries of exculpatory clauses are
usually equal; landlords and tenants are not.4 Although courts
rarely invoke doctrines of undue influence or duress when examining
exculpatory clauses,'" they do use the euphemisms "unequal bar-
gaining power" or "no alternative opportunities" to invalidate some
clauses. Even when the language of a clause is clear, courts are in-
fluenced by the relationship between the parties to a contract con-
taining an exculpatory clause." For example, a broad statement of
39. 111 Wis. 2d 203, 330 N.W.2d 773 (1983).
40. Id. at 212, 330 N.W.2d at 778.
41. Cf G. ORWELL, ANIMAL FARM 148 (1946) ("All animals are equal, but some ani-
mals are more equal than others.").
42. See infra notes 46-59 and accompanying text.
43. See In re Eagson Corp., 26 Bankr. 660 (E.D. Pa. 1982), where a debtor unsuccess-
fully tried to argue economic duress against a creditor whose contract to renovate the debtor's
building contained an exculpatory clause exonerating it from any consequences unless caused
by gross negligence.
44. Thus, for example, in Salt River Project Agricultural Improv. & Power Dist. v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 143 Ariz. 368, 384, 694 P.2d 198, 214 (1984), the court found that
a genuine issue of material fact existed precluding summary judgment, namely, "whether the
parties were in an equal bargaining position . . . [and] whether the limitation of damages was
actually bargained for." Id. at 384, 694 P.2d at 214. Note, however, that the inquiry is a
genuine one. Upholding an exculpatory clause in an oil drilling contract, one federal court
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exculpation absolving a school from "any and all liability associated
with the [field trip]" '45 did not limit liability when a nursing student
died on the trip. The court ruled the clause unenforceable because
the nursing student had no alternative classes to take and could not
but agree to the terms of the release.4
1. Consumer vs. Commercial
There seems to be a genuine impression that those who sign
exculpatory clauses are prima facie in unequal bargaining positions.
This feeling may derive from cases that pit weak tenants against
powerful landlords. The black letter law reflects an historical bias
against enforcement of landlord-tenant leases which contain lan-
guage excusing the landlord's liability for negligently maintaining or
repairing the premises. 47 Typically, courts find these contracts re-
pugnant because they perceive the landlord to be in a superior bar-
gaining position to the tenant. For instance, in Henrioulle v. Marin
Ventures, Inc. ,48 an unemployed widower with two children receiv-
ing public assistance sued a landlord after he tripped over a rock on
a common stairway in the apartment building and fractured his
wrist. The landlord was held liable despite his apparent efforts to
keep the premises safe in difficult circumstances.
This landlord-tenant flavor is not as prevalent in an examina-
tion of the decade's cases treating the equality issue, where the ter-
rain is more diverse than might be expected. While some of these
cases appear to be unduly stimulated by the language used, there is
support for the proposition that courts deem the clause to have been
noted that "[t]he mere fact that it [is] a seller's market [does] not render unfair an otherwise
reasonable, arms-length agreement." ANR Prod. Co. v. Westburne Drilling, Inc., 581 F.
Supp. 542, 547 (Colo. 1984).
45. Whittington v. Sowela Technical Inst., 438 So. 2d 236, 241 (La. App.), cert. denied,
443 So. 2d 591 (La. 1983).
46. Id. In Taylor v. Costa Lines, Inc., 441 F. Supp. 783, 787 (E.D. Pa. 1977), the
validity of an exculpatory clause in travel literature immunizing a vessel owner and a tour
operator from liability for injuries suffered by a passenger depended upon the agreement not
being "a mere contract of adhesion, which he is powerless to alter, having no alternative other
than to reject the transaction entirely."
47. See Lloyd v. Service Corp. of Alabama, 453 So. 2d 735 (Ala. 1984) (exculpatory
clause in residential lease held unenforceable). Examinations of this trend may be found in
Howell, Exculpatory Clauses in Leases, 29 How. L.J. 95 (1986); Note, Exculpatory Clause
in Residential Apartment Lease Held Void as "Unbargained For," 15 CUMB. L. REV. 765
(1984-85). Comment, Exculpatory Clause in Lease Void as Against Public Policy, 3 Miss.
COL. L. REV. 253 (1983).
48. 20 Cal. 3d 512, 573 P.2d 465, 143 Cal. Rptr. 247 (1978).
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the product of a fair fight or established precedent.4 In one case
reviewed, an aircraft owner sued an airport authority for damages
suffered when the plane he was operating taxied into a construction
excavation after landing."0 The plaintiff failed to recover the ex-
pected damages award of one-half million dollars because the court
viewed the transaction as an arm's length bargain between sophisti-
cated parties. The court stated, "[I1t is not necessary that the excul-
patory language refers expressly to the negligence . . . so long as the
intention to indemnify can be 'clearly implied from the language and
purposes of the entire agreement, and the surrounding facts and
circumstances.' "51
Similarly, indemnification and risk-shifting provisions of a lease
between an owner and lessee of a shopping center were dispassion-
ately reviewed subsequent to a suit brought by a customer who was
mugged in the center's parking lot."' The injured party, a classic
consumer, would have recovered in any case; the court was not
moved to interfere in the allocation of risk agreed upon by the com-
mercial entities.58
These cases are representative of the decisions of the last ten
years, many of which involve parties of more equal bargaining
power. In disputes between commercial tenants and their landlords,
the landlords have generally been successful. For example, the owner
49. McClure Eng'g Assocs., Inc. v. Reuben Donnelley Corp., 101 Ill. App. 3d 1109,
428 N.E.2d 1151 (1981), affd, 95 Ill. 2d 68, 447 N.E.2d 400 (1983), presents the classic
"yellow pages" scenario. In McClure, an engineering firm whose listing did not appear in
defendant's yellow page directory was unsuccessful in its suit for damages. While disparity in
bargaining power was evident, the court deemed the clause not unconscionable and upheld it.
The sting of this deference to judicial precedent was noted by a strong dissent, which failed to
see equal bargaining power. "It is like the story of the chicken and the pig who were asked to
donate ham and eggs for dinner. It was a matter of life and death to the pig . . . so it is here."
Id. at 1113, 428 N.E.2d at 1155 (Heiple, J., dissenting).
50. Niagra Frontier Transp. Auth. v. Tri-Delta Constr. Corp., 107 A.D.2d 450, 487
N.Y.S.2d 428, aft'd, 65 N.Y.2d 1038, 484 N.E.2d 1047, 494 N.Y.S.2d 695 (1985).
51. Id. at 452, 487 N.Y.S.2d at 430 (quoting Margolin v. New York Life Ins. Co., 32
N.Y.2d 149, 153, 297 N.E.2d 80, 82, 344 N.Y.S.2d 336, 339 (1973)).
52. Stier v. Shop Rite of Manalapan, 201 N.J. Super. 142, 492 A.2d 1055 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1985).
53. In order for [the owner] to recover on its indemnity, the negligence of [the
tenant] must be primary or active as compared to secondary or passive negli-
gence of [owner.] Assuming that both parties are concurrently liable with no
distinction in the degree of negligence, we hold that there is no factual or legal
basis upon which to grant indemnification in favor of [owner]. Moreover, it
appears that [owner] is liable for damages under the language of the lease which
shifts the risk to [owner] for injuries arising in the common areas, insurance for
which [tenant] contributes.
Id. at 156, 492 A.2d at 1062.
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of a stable was sued by a lessee for the loss of his horse by theft or
disappearance .5  A clause excusing liability for "all risks ...
whether caused by the active or passive negligence" 55 of the owner
bound the lessee because the language was clear and because the
court found no issue of disparity in bargaining power between the
parties. Likewise, a commercial tenant's argument against the en-
forcement of a landlord's exculpatory clause concerning water dam-
age focused on ambiguities in the language of the contract rather
than on the unequal bargaining positions of the parties. 6 Unmoved,
the court enforced the clause and denied the claim for lost profits and
damages resulting from a burst water pipe.
On the other hand, courts do not automatically approve con-
tracts negotiated by parties of relatively equal bargaining power.
They still search for transaction defects, especially ambiguity in the
contract language, and sometimes remand for further inquiry."' This
was the result in Parrino v. Royal Insurance Co., 8 where the
clause did not "clearly release" the parties from liability, and in
Richard's 5 & 10, Inc. v. Brooks Harvey Realty Investors," where
the clause exonerated the landlord from liability for water damages,
but not from failure to keep the roof in repair, the actual cause of
the water damage.
Ultimately, the concern with bargaining power focuses on fair-
ness, rather than on status. Courts seem to inquire into the actual
status of parties to exculpatory clauses even in commercial transac-
tions because they recognize that unfair surprise and unconscionable
oppression can take place in such settings. As one court stated:
With increasing frequency, courts have begun to recognize that
experienced but legally unsophisticated businessmen may be un-
fairly surprised by unconscionable contract terms and that even
large business entities may have relatively little bargaining
power, depending on the identity of the other contracting party
and the commercial circumstances surrounding the agreement.6
54. Clearwater Farms, Inc. v. Roosevelt Raceway, Inc., 118 A.D.2d 825, 500 N.Y.S.2d
311 (1986).
55. Id. at 825, 500 N.Y.S.2d at 312.
56. Fena v. Wickstrom, 348 N.W.2d 389 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
57. One court invalidated the clause in a suit by a commercial tenant against a railroad
using a two-pronged approach. Not only was the language of the clause ambiguous, but there
appeared to be disparity in bargaining power. Graham v. Chicago Rock Island & Pac. R.R.
Co., 431 F. Supp. 444, 447 (W.D. Okla. 1976).
58. 484 So. 2d 282, 289 (La. App. 1986).
59. 264 Pa. Super. 384, 399 A.2d 1103 (1979).
60. A & M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp., 135 Cal. App. 3d 473, 489, 186 Cal. Rptr.
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2. Fiduciary Relationship
Closely allied but distinguishable from the question of equal
bargaining power is the more formal relationship known as the con-
fidential or fiduciary relationship. Sometimes the status of the parties
or the importance of the activity raises questions about the enforce-
ment of an exculpatory clause, despite forthright and clear bargain-
ing between parties who have weighed and accepted the risks. Con-
sider Shorter v. Drury,1 in which a woman died from complications
resulting from the surgical procedure of dilation and curettage. She
had been advised by her physician of the risks of perforation of the
uterus and bleeding as a consequence of the operation. The patient,
a Jehovah's Witness, felt prohibited by religious doctrine from re-
ceiving blood transfusions. Prior to surgery, she and her husband,
also a Jehovah's Witness, signed a document releasing the hospital
and the physician from "any responsibility whatever for unfavorable
reactions or any untoward results due to my refusal to permit the
use of blood or its derivatives and I fully understand the possible
consequences of such refusal on my part.' '62 The doctor punctured
the woman's uterus during the D and C and she bled extensively.
Blood transfusions would likely have saved her, but both she and her
husband refused to authorize the transfusions.
Although the jury found the doctor negligent, it assigned sev-
enty-five percent of the fault to the patient on the basis that she had
assumed the risk of bleeding to death by signing the release. The
Supreme Court of Washington, sitting en banc, considered whether
the release constituted an assumption of the risk under the circum-
stances."' The plaintiff husband argued that neither he nor his wife
contemplated that the doctor would perform the operation so negli-
gently that the wife would bleed to death. Rather, he claimed that
the release covered the possibility that some blood might be required
during the course of a normal procedure. The defendant argued,
"The [document] does not release the doctor for his negligence but
only for the consequences arising out of Mrs. Shorter's voluntary
refusal to accept blood, which in this case was death.""'
The court refused to bar the plaintiff's claim. Instead, it al-
lowed the plaintiff to recover because the doctor's negligence in per-
114, 124 (1982) (emphasis in original).
61. 103 Wash. 2d 645, 695 P.2d 116, cert. denied, 474 U.S. 827 (1985).





forming the operation had proximately caused his wife's death. The
question thus presents itself: what is negligence in this situation? If
puncturing the uterus is an acknowledged risk of the operation and
its attendant bleeding is predictable, then the agreement not to accept
blood and the release of the consequences should be effective. Never-
theless, the court refused to take that analytical step, invoking in-
stead a public policy prohibition of negligence releases in medical
matters. It is as if the law placed the burden on the doctor who,
knowing he had no safety net in the form of blood transfusions to
save this patient's life in the event of bleeding, performed the opera-
tion regardless.6"
The higher duty of care expected of medical professionals seems
to be a standard feature of exculpatory clause doctrine. 6 However,
the past decade's cases yielded no clear statutory policy on the effec-
tiveness of medical releases. This absence is interesting, since it
would seem that fiduciary doctrine would be most stringent in statu-
tory law. Some states have proscribed exculpatory clauses by statute
in certain areas.67 Also, courts reveal no particular overriding con-
cern beyond the validity of the agreement and the power of the par-
ties when handling exculpatory clauses used in other professional
relationships.
It is surprising that professionals have not generally been
harmed by the fiduciary factor, despite the fact that the range of
parties qualifying as professionals has grown." For example, Dun
and Bradstreet, a credit reporting agency, was sued by a subscriber
for a negligently assembled report. The agency was sheltered by con-
65. But see Colton, 98 Misc. 2d 957, 414 N.Y.S.2d 866 (1979), where the experimental
nature of a kidney transplant was held to require enforcement of a covenant not to sue exe-
cuted by the deceased recipient of the transplant.
66. Another medical case that emerged in our review was Olson v. Molzen, 558 S.W.2d
429 (Tenn. 1977), where the Supreme Court of Tennessee had no problem declaring an excul-
patory clause in an agreement signed by a patient as a condition to receiving an abortion
invalid as against public policy. See also infra notes 86-90 and accompanying text on public
policy.
67. See, e.g., N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW §§ 5-321 - 5-332 (McKinney 1987) concerning
lessors of real property, caterers, places of public amusement as outlined in text and notes,
infra at 94. See also GA. CODE ANN. § 44-7-2 (1982) (landlord and tenant leases); ILL. REV.
STAT. chs. 80, 991 (1987) (exculpatory clauses unenforceable in real property leases); IND.
CODE ANN. § 26-2-5-1 (West 1980) (construction and design contracts).
68. "It is clear that the term 'professional services' is no longer limited to the traditional
professions of law and medicine." Ehrlich v. First NatI. Bank, 208 N.J. Super. 264, 288, 505
A.2d 220, 233 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1984) (quoting Autotote Ltd. v. N.J. Sports & Expo. Auth.,
85 N.J. 363, 371 (1981)). In Ehrlich, a psychiatrist-investor sued the bank for mismanage-
ment of a custodial securities account. The court decided to hold the bank to "professional"
standards and refused to enforce the exculpatory clause. Id. at 288, 505 A.2d at 225.
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tractual language stating that it "does not and cannot guarantee the
correctness or completeness of information furnished." 9 The court
found the clause effective because the contract was "entered into
freely by parties concerning their private affairs and is not an adhe-
sion contract."70 However, the court denied the defendant's summary
judgment motion in order to provide plaintiff an opportunity to
prove gross negligence. Similarly, the claim of an investor who sued
Citicorp for losses suffered in an advisory account was swiftly dis-
patched by an unsympathetic court.7
Engineers have also benefited from exculpatory clauses. In
Harman v. C.E.& M., Inc. ,72 a landowner's oral agreement to ex-
cuse an engineer for any responsibility arising from the design of a
foundation slab that ultimately proved defective was enforced. Simi-
larly, an independent inspector sued by an insurer for failing to dis-
cover and disclose a serious risk of flooding had an effective shield in
language providing that "we do not assume any legal liability due to
misinformation given our inspector nor for inaccuracies, human er-
ror, etc. '7 '8 A homeowner was unsuccessful in his quest to obtain
damages from a termite company for termite infestation when the
contract limited the damages recoverable to retreatment7 4 In each
case, the court failed to impose any specific obligation upon the
"professional."
Unfortunately for those in the real estate business, there ap-
pears a contrary tendency toward liability. While sellers and pur-
chasers are not exactly in a fiduciary relationship, the former's over-
riding knowledge and control over the details of the transaction
69. Fidelity Leasing Corp. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 494 F. Supp. 786, 788 (E.D. Pa.
1980).
70. Id.
71. Piercy v. Citibank N.A., 101 Misc. 2d 302, 424 N.Y.S.2d 76 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978).
72. 493 N.E.2d 1319 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986). See also W.H. Lyman Constr. Co. v.
Gurnee, 84 Ill. App. 3d 28, 403 N.E.2d 1325 (1980), where a contractor's suit against an
engineering firm and others for breach of warranty of accuracy and sufficiency of plans and
specifications was only partially successful against an exculpatory provision.
73. Mutual Marine Office, Inc. v. Atwell, Vogel & Sterling, Inc., 485 F. Supp. 351,
353 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). See also American Druggists' Ins. Co. v. Equifax, Inc., 505 F. Supp.
66, 68 (S.D. Ohio 1980) (an inspector who reported on the wrong building for a fire insurer
was insulated from liability by a clause providing that "accuracy is not guaranteed"). But see
Rubin v. AMC Home Inspection & Warranty Serv., 175 N.J. Super. 315, 324, 418 A.2d 306,
311 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1980) (a homebuyer's suit against a home inspection service was not
barred by an exculpatory clause because the language of the agreement was not sufficiently
clear); Kuyper v. Gulf Oil Corp., 410 A.2d 164 (Del. Super. Ct. 1979) (a suit against a
chimney cleaning company was remanded on the issue of whether an exculpatory clause ex-
cused a duty to inspect).
74. Wilcher v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 145 Ga. App. 551, 244 S.E.2d 101 (1978).
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militate toward imposing a certain standard on their behavior.7 ' For
example, in a suit by home buyers against a builder-vendor, an ex-
culpatory clause succumbed to the duty of the builder to comply with
the implied warranty of habitability.7" The court said that the war-
ranty of habitability "is implied as a separate covenant between the
builder-vendor and the vendee because of the unusual dependent re-
lationship existing between them."7 Likewise, a seller's attempt to
limit his liability in a real estate contract involving a time share con-
dominium received the following judicial rebuke: "[T]his provision
[limiting liability to the return of purchaser's deposit] renders the
seller's obligation wholly illusory and would permit him to breach
with impunity. ' 8
The vulnerability of exculpatory clauses in real estate contracts
is great unless the consideration is nominal and the clause affects the
deal only peripherally. One can hardly challenge the substantive
fairness of the decision in Lynch v. Santa Fe National Bank.79 In
that case, the bank, acting as escrow agent, agreed to deliver some
documents under certain conditions for a fee of forty-five dollars.
The conditions under which the documents were to be released were
not clearly articulated. As a result, the bank delivered the documents
in error. The bank sought protection from liability for its error
under an exculpatory clause."0 The court enforced the clause, citing
the modest fee paid the bank, the dangers involved in the execution
of the duty, and the lack of any strong public interest in the
transaction. 1
75. For a discussion of fiduciary factors and realtors, see Sacasas & Wiesner, Realtor as
"Superbroker": Great Expectations Unrealized?, 21 AKRON L. Rev. 1 (1987).
76. Park v. Sohn, 90 Ill. App. 3d 794, 414 N.E.2d 1 (1980), aff d in part and rev'd in
part, 89 Ill. 2d 453, 433 N.E.2d 651 (1982).
77. Id. at 797, 414 N.E.2d at 4 (quoting Petersen v. Hubschman Construction, 76 I1.
2d 31, 389 N.E.2d 1154 (1979)).
78. Port Largo Club, Inc. v. Warren, 476 So. 2d 1330, 1333 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
79. 97 N.M. 554, 627 P.2d 1247 (N.M. Ct. App. 1981).
80. As a controlling part of the acceptance of this escrow, the Bank shall not be
liable for any of its acts or omissions done in good faith, nor shall it be liable for
any claims, demands, losses or damages made, claimed, or suffered by any party
to this escrow, excepting such as may arise through or be caused by the Bank's
wilful or gross negligence.
Id. at 556, 627 P.2d at 1249.
81. The court noted that the public interest factor would have mandated a different
result in California, where this transaction is regulated by statute. Id. at 559, 627 P.2d at
1253. For a critique of this decision in light of the Tunkl criteria, see Note, A Bank's Liability
for Ordinary Negligence: Lynch v. Santa Fe National Bank, 12 N.M.L. REV. 821 (1982).
The lack of an articulated public policy fueled- the decision in Kelley v. Astor Investors,
Inc., 123 I1. App. 3d 593, 462 N.E.2d 996 (1984), aff'd, 106 Il1. 2d 505, 478 N.E.2d 1346
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The fiduciary standard does not apply to the occasional case
where a seller attempts to excuse his misrepresentations, innocent or
otherwise,8  or where insurance undertakings are at issue.88 For ex-
ample, one case involved a builder who failed to install a septic tank
system properly."' The contract was silent as to the specific manner
in which this duty was to be performed. The builder argued that
language in the contract limiting liability was intended to address
negligence in installing septic tanks. The court disagreed. Having
undertaken the task, the builder had an absolute obligation to prop-
erly install the system.85
Obviously, the power and status of the parties play important
roles in the judiciary's handling of exculpatory clauses. However, the
approach taken frequently merges into that area of "overall fairness"
policed by public policy. Indeed, the role of public policy in this area
of law cannot be underestimated. Whether used as a sword against
the clause, or as a shield, public policy merits close examination in
any analysis of exculpatory agreements.
C. Public Policy
The contract term "exculpatory" is almost a flash word stimu-
lating comment on issues of "public policy." The connection is war-
ranted. Clothing a rationale within the mantle of public policy is a
powerful judicial technique. Although its presence was sometimes
(1985), where condominium owners sued an interim Board of Managers for damages based on
structural defects in the common elements. The owners were unsuccessful in establishing a
contractually-implied duty sufficient to overcome an exculpatory clause. Finding no formal
policy statements on the issue, the court noted that "such legislative silence prevents this court
from injecting such a restriction, no matter how beneficial the attempted innovation might be."
Kelley, 123 I1. App. 3d at 559, 462 N.E.2d at 1000.
82. Maples v. Charles Burt Realtor, Inc., 690 S.W.2d 202, 213 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985) (a
broker's exculpatory clause was considered mere " 'boilerplate' recital . . . wholly ineffective
[against] liability for specific fradulent representations" concerning termite damage); Zucker-
man-Vernon Corp. v. Rosen, 361 So. 2d 804, 806 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (a suit against
vendors, brokers, and others was not barred by language excusing responsibility for untrue
facts because one "cannot contract against liability for [one's] own fraud") (emphasis in origi-
nal). But see James v. Naumann, 464 So. 2d 1260 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985), reh'g denied,
476 So. 2d 674 (Fla. 1985) (a sales agreement clause that a buyer's decision to purchase was
based on his own inspection and investigation insulated the seller from liability for fraud).
83. Metropolitan Art Assocs., Div. of Metro Art Sales, Inc. v. Wexler, 118 A.D. 548,
499 N.Y.S.2d 164 (1986), where tenants prevailed in their suit against a landlord for negli-
gently permitting smoke and soot to emit from a heating unit, damaging tenants' personal
property. The court, in denying an exculpatory clause, noted that while a mutual waiver of
liability is ineffective, a clause requiring "any party" to obtain insurance would be permissible.
84. Rodriguez v. Gilbertie, 33 Conn. Supp. 582, 363 A.2d 759 (1976).
85. Id. at 585, 363 A.2d at 761.
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disguised,8 this technique affected many of the decisions involving
exculpatory clauses examined here. Its influence can be observed in
cases where public policy governs the mechanics of offer and accept-
ance and imposes a restraint upon a favorable interpretation of an
exculpatory clause.87 Courts and doctrinal writers employ the public
policy sword most heavily as a frontal attack on the clause.
1. Generally
What is public policy? Is it nothing more than a composite of
constitutional and statutory provisions and judicial decisions?" Or
does it have vulgar components as well?
In many of its aspects the term public policy is but another
name for public sentiment. Like public sentiment, that which we call
public policy is often shifting and lacks the permanency upon which
principles of law are, or should be, based, although there are fea-
tures of public policy which are as enduring and immutable as the
law of gravity. 9 Modern thought unpretentiously views public pol-
icy as a "principle of judicial legislation or interpretation founded on
the current needs of the community." 90
The decade's cases indicate that exculpatory clauses are denied
sometimes as a matter of principle and at other times as a matter of
pragmatism. The latter procedure is suggested in cases where the
injury at issue aroused the court's compassion so that the relevant
exculpatory clause could not succeed regardless of the legal merit of
the proponent's argument. 1 On the other hand, as a matter of prin-
86. An exculpatory provision of a utility company's tariff was not enforced in De Fran-
cesco v. Western Pennsylvania Water Co., 329 Pa. Super. 508, 478 A.2d 1295 (1984). The
court reasoned that otherwise the water company would have no reason to insure adequate
pressure to extinguish fires. Moreover, as a matter of public policy, the utility was in the best
position to reduce risk; the customer had no control over such things as water pressure and was
generally unaware of the existence of such a clause.
87. See supra notes 12-40 and accompanying text (sections I., A., 1.-2.).
88. B. CATALDO, F. KEMPLIN, & C. WEBER, INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND THE LAW
PsiocEss, 600 (3d ed. 1987) [hereinafter CATALDO]. See also Kelley, 123 I1. App. 3d at 598,
462 N.E.2d at 1000, noting that "[plublic policy, while not precisely defined, is located by
reference to the State constitution, State statute, judicial decisions, and the constant practice of
government officials."
89. CATALDO, supra note 88, at 601 (quoting Neazey v. Allen, 173 N.Y. 359, 66 N.E.
103 (1903)).
90. Winfield, Public Policy and the English Common Law, 42 HARV. L. REv. 76, 92
(1928), noted in CATALDO, supra note 88, at 601.
91. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin refused to enforce an exculpatory clause in Ar-
nold v. Shawano County Agric. Soc., 111 Wis. 2d 203, 330 N.W.2d 773 (Wis. 1983), where a
race car driver alleged that his serious injuries were not the result of the crash, but rather were
caused by toxic substances used to extinguish the fire while rescuing him. Similarly, in another
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ciple, it is interesting to speculate how some clauses succeeded be-
cause causation questions tempered the initial negative attitude
courts entertained toward the clauses. This last point will be more
fully developed in the section reviewing the vitality of exculpatory
clauses. For the present, we will comment on public policy as it is
openly advanced in the cases of the past decade through statutory or
judicial techniques.
2. Statutory Public Policy
Formal statements by a legislative body take the form of stat-
utes. Statutes are positive law within a jurisdiction. If a state statute
expressly invalidates exculpatory clauses that attempt to exempt bar-
bers from negligence in shaving their customers, a court would deny
the enforcement of such a clause by effortlessly applying the
statute.92
As a matter of judicial restraint and nicety, it would hardly be
necessary to dwell on public policy issues where a statute addressing
exculpatory clauses was clear or involved constitutional principles.9"
New York, for example, has a relatively comprehensive statutory
scheme in which exculpatory clauses in specific areas are declared
void." Lessors of real property,95 caterers, and building service or
type of case where the clause usually stands, the Supreme Court of Tennessee allowed the
injured motorcyle racer an opportunity to prove gross negligence in selecting material for cer-
tain posts located near the finish line. Adams, 686 S.W.2d 73 (Tenn. 1985).
92. This positive law can take various forms. A court can look to safety ordinances,
John's Pass Seafood Co. v. Weber, 369 So. 2d 616 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (the failure of a
lessor to provide fire extinguishing equipment was not encompassed by exculpatory language
in the lease) as well as specific statutory law. See, e.g., Deese v. Parks, 157 Ga. App. 116, 276
S.E.2d 269 (1981) (Georgia statutes prohibit exculpatory clauses in construction and repair
contracts and in residential landlord-tenant agreements); First Fin. Ins. Co. v. Purolator Sec.
Inc., 69 IIl. App. 3d 413, 388 N.E.2d 17 (1979) (Illinois by statute has declared such clauses
inapplicable in business leases, health club memberships, stock car racing, the rental of riding
equipment and stabling of horses, but not in burglar alarm cases); La Frenz v. Lake County
Fair Bd., 172 Ind. App. 389, 360 N.E.2d 605 (1977) (Indiana statutes invalidate exculpatory
clauses in construction and design contracts, but not in highway construction).
A court can also use general statutory law to implement strongly held public policy beliefs
such as that a seller should be liable for defective or mislabeled seed. Agricultural Servs. Ass'n,
Inc. v. Ferry-Morse Seed Co., Inc., 551 F.2d 1057 (6th Cir. 1977) (applying California law).
93. NAACP v. Detroit Police Officers Ass'n, 591 F. Supp. 1194, 1201 (E.D. Mich.
1984), injunction orders rev'd, 821 F.2d 328 (6th Cir. 1987), where black police officers'
action against the city of Detroit was not encumbered by an agreement which affected affirma-
tive action duties. The court stated that parties cannot "by contract limit their liability for pre-
existing constitutional violations."
94. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-321 (McKinney 1978) (lessors of real property); § 5-
322 (caterers and catering establishments); § 5-322.1 (owners and contractors involved in con-
struction); § 5-323 (building service or maintenance contractors); § 5-324 (architects, engineers
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maintenance contractors, for instance, cannot immunize themselves
from the consequences of their own negligence, even if the immuni-
zation is the product of a fair bargain. A typical statute, in this case
concerning places of public amusement or recreation, provides:
Every covenant, agreement or understanding pursuant to which
such owner or operator receives a fee for the use of such facili-
ties, which exempts owner from liability for damages caused by
or resulting from the negligence of the owner, operator, or per-
son in charge, or their agents, servants or employees, shall be
deemed to be void as against public policy and wholly
unenforceable."
Statutes such as this often stimulate and inform the public pol-
icy dimension of judicial decisions regarding exculpatory clauses even
if the facts of the dispute are not exactly on point. In Geise v. County
of Niagara,'97 the plaintiff was injured while tobogganing in a
county-owned facility. He invoked the language of the statute noted
above in his suit against the county. The court refused to strike
down the County's exculpatory clause under the statute because the
plaintiff had not paid for admission to the facility, as required by the
statute. However, the court did deny summary judgment to the de-
fendant, preserving for review the language of the release."
Sometimes statutes assist those who argue for the disqualifica-
tion of exculpatory clauses. In Blanc v. Windham Mountain Club,
Inc., a clause already weakened by transaction defects was found to
be "in clear conflict with the public policy of the State" as expressed
by the New York statute noted above." The defendant's attempt to
carve out an exception for private membership clubs from this rule
drew this response:
Whether the exculpation of liability be hidden in barely legible
print on the reverse side of an admission ticket, or buried in
and surveyors); § 5-325 (garages and parking places); § 5-326 (pools, gymnasiums, public
amusement places).
95. Note the exception that it is permissible to require a property owner to purchase
insurance as the sole remedy for negligence in real property contracts. Board of Educ. v.
Valden Assocs., 46 N.Y.2d 653, 389 N.E.2d 798, 416 N.Y.S.2d 202 (1979).
96. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-326 (McKinney 1978).
97. 117 Misc. 2d 470, 458 N.Y.S.2d 162 (1983).
98. The agreement, which included a general release for "any liability for any harm,
injury, damage including all risks whether foreseen or unforeseen" needed to say "negligence"
or "neglect" or "fault" to be effective. Id. at 471, 458 N.Y.S.2d at 164. See supra note 25 and
accompanying text.
99. 115 Misc. 2d 404, 410, 454 N.Y.S.2d 383, 389 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1983) (citing N.Y.
GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-326 (McKinney 1978)).
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some unnoticeable portion of a membership application, or, as
here, concealed within separate unpublished by-laws of the es-
tablishment, the end result is to conceal from consumers that the
owner or operator sought to absolve itself of liability.1"'
Public policy, like public opinion, is a useful but not always
certain guide. It can tell the draftsperson where not to go, but not
where or how far to go.10' Idaho, for example, enacted a statute
which required licenses for outfitters and guides. The only duties
imposed upon those persons were the payment of fees and the main-
tenance of general businessworthy conditions.1 2 These responsibili-
ties were expanded when the Legislature amended the statute.108
Along with some specific duties to be observed by outfitters and
guides, the amendment listed the general duty "to conform to the
standard of care expected of members of [the] profession.
'10 4
Idaho's amended outfitters and guides statute was discussed in
Lee v. Sun Valley Co.' 05 In that case, a horse rider was injured
when his horse reared and his saddle slipped. The rider sued the
resort company that had provided the horse, alleging that an em-
ployee had improperly readjusted the cinch on the horse's saddle.
The contract between the rider and the resort company contained an
exculpatory provision that was specific and that fairly informed the
signer of the risks involved.
The trial court entered summary judgment against the rider,
who appealed to the Supreme Court of Idaho. The principal issue on
appeal was whether the Idaho statute regulating outfitters and
guides imposed a public duty on the defendant. As the court noted,
"Itihe idea of a public duty is closely related to the idea of public
100. Id. at 412, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 390.
101. This lesson was learned by a commercial carrier whose contract stipulated that it
would be immune from their own, or their agent's, negligence. The court held that while
private carriers can so contract, commercial ones cannot, unless the consignee receives some
consideration for the limitation, such as lower rates. Caribbean Produce Exch., Inc. v. Sea
Land Serv., Inc., 415 F. Supp. 88 (D.P.R. 1976).
102. IDAHO CODE §§ 36-2101 - 36-2118 (1987).
103. The Legislature recognizes that there are inherent risks in the recreational
activities provided by outfitters which should be understood by each participant.
These risks are essentially impossible to eliminate by outfitters and guides. It is
the purpose of this chapter to define those areas of responsibility and affirmative
acts for which outfitters and guides shall be liable for loss, damage, or injury,
and to define those risks which the participant expressly assumes and for which
there can be no recovery.
Id. at § 6-1201.
104. Id. § 6-1204.
105. 107 Idaho 976, 695 P.2d 361 (1984).
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policy and it is within the domain of the legislature, elected by the
public, to determine such duties and policies."' 0 The Supreme
Court affirmed the lower court and ruled that the agreement ab-
solved the defendant of common law duties. The court, however, did
not absolve defendant of such statutory duties as that required by the
standard of the profession. Unfortunately for the plaintiff rider, the
court was not satisfied that the rider had supplied evidence on the
standard of care expected of the outfitters and guides. The defendant,
on the other hand, had provided affidavits of due care and the depo-
sition of the plaintiff in support of the successful motion for sum-
mary judgment.
The case would not be remarkable if the public policy issues
raised therein were found irrelevant on the grounds that the guide,
the defendant's agent, was not negligent when he readjusted the
cinch. A strong dissent by two justices focused on both public policy
issues and the procedural posture of the case. The heaviest criticism
came from Justice Bistline, who charged that enforcement of the
contract would "make a mockery of a substantial part' '7 of the stat-
ute, which stood as a "statement of public policy of the State of
Idaho with respect to outfitters, guides, and their activities."'o' Such
enforcement, he argued, would open the door to the extinguishment
of every obligation of law.' His dissenting opinion concluded:
If the statutory mandate can be avoided by an exculpatory
clause, unquestionably, every person licensed under the Outfit-
ters and Guides Act, could by contract, absolve himself com-
pletely of all obligations to the public and there would be no
need for the enactment of that legislation.'"
It is unclear to these readers whether public policy now favors
outfitters and guides. However, it does seem evident that the major-
ity views the statute as literally protecting the public."'
106. Id. at 979, 695 P.2d at 363.
107. Id. at 983, 695 P.2d at 368.
108. Id. at 982, 695 P.2d at 367.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 984, 695 P.2d at 369.
111. A Georgia court, finding "no statute which either expressly or impliedly forbids
contractual waivers of liability by participants in sporting or recreational events,"' enforced a
similar release in a case involving similar facts. Carrion v. Smokey, Inc., 164 Ga. App. 790,
791, 298 S.E.2d 584, 585 (1983). But see O'Connell v. Walt Disney World Co., 413 So. 2d
444 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) in which a release in favor of a stable at Disneyworld was not
enforced on language and transaction grounds.
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3. Judicial Public Policy
In the absence of legislative instruction, courts articulate public
policy assisted only by judicial precedent and their own estimation of
the community's sensitivities. The opportunity to express public pol-
icy was available to the United States Supreme Court in an admi-
ralty case involving the tug towing business. Bisso v. Inland Water-
ways Corp."' involved a towing contract containing an exculpatory
clause which provided that certain towing should be at the sole risk
of the plaintiff barge-owners. Another provision in the agreement
made the barge owners the masters of the towboat's crew. The ex-
pected scope of behavior was unpretentious, the range of risky ma-
neuvers was narrow, and the parties to the undertaking were sophis-
ticated. While being towed by defendant's tug, the plaintiff's barge
collided with a bridge and sank. The towing was performed negli-
gently. The Supreme Court ruled that the exculpatory clause was
against public policy. Applying judge-made admiralty law, which
discourages negligence in the field of towing, the Court said that the
elimination of exculpatory clauses in such cases prevents tugowners
from overreaching those in need of towing."
The policy conclusions reached by the majority in Bisso have
not been extended to other business contractor cases, where the scope
of activity is broader and the risks far greater than those present in
the tug-towing business. A number of cases involving ship repair
wrestle with an apparently standard exculpatory term called a "red
letter" clause. Such clauses typically state that a contractor "shall not
be liable . . . to or by any vessel . . . or individual . . . in contract,
tort or otherwise, to its owners, charterers, underwriters, etc., for any
injury, loss or damage to or by such vessel . . . or person or for any
consequences thereto."" 4
In Hudson Waterways Corp. v. Coastal Marine Service,
Inc.,' 5 a shore-based contractor engaged in repair work on a vessel
allowed a ramp extending from its work barge to shore to become
slippery with mud. Neither handrails nor cleats were provided to aid
parties traversing the ramp. The vessel owner employed a seaman
who slipped and fell on the ramp while descending from the contrac-
tor's barge to the shore. The vessel owner was required to pay dam-
112. 349 U.S. 85 (1955).
113. Id. at 90.





ages to the seaman and then sought indemnification and/or contribu-
tion from the contractor.
The contractor's main defense was to invoke the immunity
granted him by the red letter clause. Examining this defense under
federal maritime law, the court noted, "If the contract does in some
way cause real harm to the public, then the court should not hesitate
to refrain from enforcing it." 1  The vessel owner pressed the court
to apply the Bisso rule to the dispute. The court refused, stating:
It appears to the Court that the Bisso decision, which held that
release of liability clauses in towing contracts were void, was
based on the particular characteristics of the towing industry,
and the Supreme Court did not make a determination that re-
lease of liability clauses were against public policy and void in
all contracts concerning admiralty matters.117
Although the red letter clause was enforced in this case, it is
important to note that the clause did not affect the rights of third
parties. For instance, the seaman could have sued the contractor di-
rectly. The clause was exposed to attack only by a professional com-
mercial contractor.
Although the tug-towing business has a public interest feature
by judicial mandate, later courts have not freely applied the rationale
used in tug-towing cases to disputes involving other ship busi-
nesses." 8 Red letter clauses have been most effective in what might
be called the acetylene torch cases. In Coastal Iron Works, Inc. v.
Petty Ray Geophysical, Division of Geosource, Inc.'" for example, a
shipyard sought a declaratory judgment to limit liability arising from
a fire which damaged a ship undergoing repairs. The court enforced
the shipyard's exculpatory clause stating that a "shipyard contract
limiting liability will be upheld so long as the parties to the contract
have more or less equal bargaining strength. 12 0
116. Id. at 605.
117. Id. at 606.
118. Public policy arguments are virtually useless in ship repair cases. The complex
relationships among repair parties, owners, and insurance companies is examined at great
length in Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Turbine Serv., Inc., 467 F. Supp. 1257, 1298 (E.D. La.
1978), affid in part and rev'd in part, 674 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1982). In M/V American
Queen v. San Diego Marine Constr. Corp., 708 F.2d 1483 (9th Cir. 1983), where the clause
was effective in excusing the defective installation of a rudder, the court ruled that the mere
fact that the exculpatory clause was standard did not make it a contract of adhesion.
119. 783 F.2d 577 (5th Cir. 1986).
120. Id. at 583. See also Morton v. Zidell Explorations, Inc., 695 F.2d 347 (9th Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1039 (1983), where tugboat owners sued a shipyard for negli-
gence after the ship was almost destroyed by fire during the course of conversion into a fish-
processing vessel.
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Courts often do not approve of red letter clauses being used
against individual workers, even when the workers qualify legally
and technically as independent contractors. In Lopez v. AIS and
DIS Svendbord,2 1 a longshoreman working cargo in the hold of a
ship was injured when the cargo shifted and packages were broken
open. The court ruled that the Shipyard's red letter clause was void
as being against public policy under the Harbor Workers Compen-
sation Act.
Sometimes judicial opinions produce formulae. One scheme for
evaluating exculpatory clauses that contains a strong emphasis on
public policy is reported in Tunkl v. Regents of the University of
California.122 There, a hospital admission form contained a clause
which released the hospital from future negligence. In evaluating the
enforceability of the clause, the California Supreme Court set forth
several criteria to determine whether policy concerns should render
the clause void.
According to Tunkl, a court should first inquire whether the
business is generally subject to or suitable for public regulation and
whether the party seeking to be excused under the clause is perform-
ing a "service of great importance to the public. '123 Second, whether
the individual appears willing to perform this service for any mem-
ber of the public and the relative bargaining strength of the parties
in the economic setting of the transaction are important. 24 Courts
should be suspicious when examining a "standardized adhesion con-
tract of exculpations," if the party advancing the clause has superior
bargaining power.125 Finally, the extent to which "the property or
the person of the purchaser is placed under the control of the seller"
should be gauged in giving efficacy to the clause.1 6 This formulation
has achieved prominence in the case law and is invoked as a public
policy yardstick by some courts."2
121. 581 F.2d 319 (2d Cir. 1978).
122. 60 Cal. 2d 92, 383 P.2d 441, 32 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1963).
123. Id. at 101, 383 P.2d at 446, 32 Cal. Rptr. at 38-39. This determination may be
made as a matter of public policy by reference to statutory or generally accepted judicial cate-
gories, or it may be a case-by-case decision. For example, in Cregg v. Ministor Ventures, 148
Cal. App. 3d 1107, 196 Cal. Rptr. 724 (1983), the court held that the operator of a storage
space was not precluded from incorporating an exculpatory clause against its lessees by the
public interest inquiry mandated by Tunkl.
124. Tunkl v. Regents of the Univ. of Ca., 60 Cal. 2d 92, 101, 383 P.2d 441, 446, 32
Cal. Rptr. 33, 38 (1963).
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. See, e.g., Porubiansky v. Emory University, 156 Ga. App. 602, 275 S.E.2d 163
(1980), afj'd, 282 S.E.2d 903 (1981), citing Tunkl in reversing the trial court's grant of sum-
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Medical or quasi-medical activities which affect lives meet pub-
lic policy tests, whether of the Tunki genre or otherwise. For exam-
ple, in Tatham v. Hoke,'" a patient signed an agreement which con-
tained a 30-day notice of claim provision and which limited damages
to $15,000. The patient successfully sued a physician who performed
an abortion negligently because the agreement was found to be
against public policy. A dental school fared no better in Porubiansky
v. Emory University,'. despite the fact that the school was primarily
a training institution providing low cost care. Although the justices
concurred in striking down the exculpatory clause at issue in that
case, Chief Judge Deen raised certain questions regarding the role of
the court in finding public policy:
I concur fully with the majority opinion. However, I must add
that the judiciary should whenever possible avoid establishing
public policy, as this is the primary duty of the legislature. The
courts generally should refrain from judicial law making
through interpretation, legislation, or intervention in matters of
public policy, unless the need and principle involved is clear and
convincing. There are two purposes of public policy. One is of
utility and one is of principle. Where the matter is one exclu-
sively of utility, I definitely feel that the courts should not inter-
vene or establish public policy, as this is best left to our elected
representatives and lawmakers. But, as here, where the question
is primarily a matter of interpretation and ascertainment of the
best legal theory plus application of principle, then I believe this
case is sufficiently clear and convincing that our court may in
this limited situation extend the standard or rule of public pol-
icy as herein pronounced.180
The cases of the past decade follow neither Judge Deen's re-
straint nor the distinctions made in his concurrence. A decision like
mary judgment in favor of Emory University School of Dentistry in a suit by a patient treated
at a minimal cost. Other courts have applied the public policy formula to justify enforcing the
exculpatory clause. See, e.g., Hulsey v. Elsinore Parachute Center, 168 Cal. App. 3d 333, 342,
214 Cal. Rptr. 194, 199 (1985) (the Tunkl analysis was held not applicable in a suit against a
parachute jumping center); Cregg, 148 Cal. App. 3d at 1107, 196 Cal. Rptr. at 724 (a lessee's
suit against a storage center was barred by the clause, and not a public interest contract under
Tunkl); Schlobohm v. Spa Petite, Inc., 326 N.W.2d 920 (Minn. 1982) (clause enforced against
health spa customer, not a service of public interest); Petry v. Cosmopolitan Spa Int'l, Inc., 641
S.W.2d 202, 203 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1982) (following the Tunkl criteria in upholding a clause in
a health spa contract because it was not "generally thought suitable for public regulation").
128. 469 F. Supp. 914 (W.D.N.C. 1979), affd without opinion, 622 F.2d 587 (4th Cir.
1980).
129. 156 Ga. App. 602, 275 S.E.2d 163, aff'd, 248 Ga. 391, 282 S.E.2d 903 (1980).
130. Id. at 609, 275 S.E.2d at 169-70.
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that in Dixon v. Manier. a is uncommon. There, the Tennessee
court in excusing a school of cosmetology for its actions in causing
loss of hair simply stated that "public policy of Tennessee favors
freedom of contract against liability for negligence . . . [except for] a
common carrier or those who have a specific duty imposed on
them. .. ."" The more generally discernible approach is to em-
ploy the public policy sword to deter the distasteful results of free-
dom of contract. The exculpatory clause is especially vulnerable to
this attack as a theoretical principle, although the cases of the last
decade do not yield a developed analysis of this point.
II. VITALITY
Having examined the vulnerability of exculpatory clauses under
several legal theories, the obvious question presents itself: What ac-
counts for the undeniable vitality of exculpatory clauses? Of the
cases reviewed, approximately fifty-five percent of the exculpatory
clauses at issue survived judicial scrutiny. We attempt here to offer
some explanation for this favorable percentage.
A. Generally
It woula seem that proponents pressing for the enforcement of
exculpatory clauses would first use their strongest legal argument:
the freedom of contract doctrine. " ' Traditionally, this doctrine has
favored the adjustment of private interests among affected parties.'"
But the ethic is weakening and the scope of public interest is widen-
ing. This trend is evidenced by the enactment of protective legisla-
tion, the application of unconscionability principles, and the general
erosion of a judicial attitude that has historically supported such doc-
trines as caveat emptor.
Putting aside the freedom of contract argument and the possibil-
ity of little or no negligence in the first instance," the vitality of the
131. 545 S.W.2d 948 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1976).
132. Id. at 950.
133. "The public policy favoring freedom of contract prevails over any conflicting poli-
cies." Kelley, 123 Ill. App. 3d at 597, 462 N.E.2d at 1000 (where condominium owners sued
the developers and others for damages based on structural defects).
134. The effect of this tradition can reach bizarre levels. Even a widow, distraught to
find no room for her husband's body in the crypt purchased for him, was limited by the
contractual agreement to accept a substitute crypt of equal value and similar location in the
event of any error. Aho v. Blanchette, 18 Mass. App. Ct. 149, 463 N.E.2d 1203 (1984).
135. A number of decisions in favor of the defendant might be explained as benefiting
from such favorable facts, particularly the decision of the Idaho Supreme Court involving a
rider thrown from a horse by reason of a slipped cinch. See Lee v. Sun Valley Co., 107 Idaho
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exculpatory clause may be explained on grounds other than the phil-
osophical and the psychological. It is offered here that the clauses
may benefit from what we might call a "black hole" theory, a causa-
tion based analysis, and by reason of the presence of a number of
"selected judicial techniques," all of which intersect the issue of ex-
culpatory excuse.
B. The Causation Factor or "Black Hole" Theory
Do some exculpatory clauses benefit from a sense of fairness,
arguably fueled by causation concerns? Are there cases where the
harm suffered is not easily traceable to a single and simple instance
of failure to exercise reasonable care? Or, perhaps, are there in-
stances where the injury or damage was not primarily caused by the
behavior of the defendant? For example, was there a likelihood of
injury or damage from so many different sources and influences that
reasonable people would not contract in the absence of some prom-
ised immunity? What if there exists in the mind of the judge or the
jury a basic question as to where ultimate control lies? The extent
and unforeseeability of factors beyond the parties' control-the
"black hole" of causation-is perhaps what is contemplated by those
whose well-drafted contracts were found to have effectively excused
negligence or limited liability.
Although few cases explicitly address causation in connection
with exculpatory clauses, the circumstances in Mutual Marine Of-
fice, Inc. v. Atwell, Vogel & Sterling, Inc.,1"6 suggest recognition of
the black hole theory described above. In that case, an independent
inspector failed to disclose to a flood insurance company that the
premises were located between 400 and 1,000 feet from the Susque-
hanna River. A flood caused damage and the insurer sought recovery
from the inspector for the amount paid under the insured's claim.
The court upheld an exculpatory clause which provided that the in-
spector assumed no legal liability for misinformation, inaccuracies or
human error. Although the clause passed examination on grounds
appropriate to other cases, the reader is struck by the court's parting
remark that the insurer could not have cancelled the insurance in
976, 695 P.2d 361 (1984). Another example involved a Catholic school which failed to cor-
rectly diagnose appendicitis. The court in Battig, 482 F. Supp. 338 (W.D. La. 1979), enforced
a provision releasing the school "from any and all liability of every nature" and granted sum-
mary judgment against the parents who sued when their child suffered a burst appendix.
Although not explicitly addressing the question of negligence, the court's disinclination to in-
validate this broad term bespeaks its implicit negative answer to the question.
136. 485 F. Supp. 351 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
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time even if it had received an accurate report from the inspector.'3 7
Simply because courts have avoided any discussion of causation
does not mean that parties drafting exculpatory clauses have ignored
the issue. Observe a typical burglar alarm and security contract,
which provides:
[I]t is impractical and extremely difficult to fix the actual dam-
ages, if any, which may proximately result from a failure to
perform any of the obligations herein, or the failure of the sys-
tem to properly operate with resulting loss to Subscriber be-
cause of, among other things:
a. The uncertain amount or value of property .. .which may
be lost, stolen, destroyed, damaged ...
b. The uncertainty of the response time of any police or fire
department, should [they] be dispatched ...
c. The inability to ascertain what portion, if any, of any loss
would be proximately caused by Company's failure to perform
or by failure of its equipment to operate;
d. The nature of the service to be performed by Company.' 8
Clauses such as this are regularly enforced, even in the face of large
losses."39 The law has become "case hardened."" In the words of a
137. Id. at 355.
138. General Bargain Center v. American Alarm Co., 430 N.E.2d 407, 409 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1982), where damages for a $19,000 loss were limited to the contractual amount of $250.
Similar provisions permeate the industry. See, e.g., Chami v. Automatic Burglar Alarm Corp.,
106 Misc. 2d 559, 560, 434 N.Y.S.2d 330, 331 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1980); Greene St. Corp. v. AFA
Protective Sys., Inc., 100 Misc. 2d 334, 335, 418 N.Y.S.2d 971, 972 (1979).
139. Sanif, Inc. v. Iannotti, 119 A.D.2d 654, 500 N.Y.S.2d 798 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986)
(limitation of 10% of contract price or $18 enforced against a retailer's claim for $25,000 loss);
Allendale Mut. Ins. Co. v. Leaseway Warehouse, Inc., 624 F. Supp. 637 (N.D. IIl. 1985)
(limitation enforced); Tessler & Son, Inc. v. Sonitrol Sec. Sys., Inc., 203 N.J. Super. 477, 497
A.2d 530 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1985); Advance Burglar Alarm Sys., Inc. v. D'Auria,
110 A.D.2d 860, 488 N.Y.S.2d 416 (1985) (clause enforced as not unconscionable); Mankap,
427 So. 2d 332 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (limitations clause upheld, but remanded for in-
quiry as to fraud); West Side Loan Office v. Electro-Protective Corp., 167 Ga. App. 520, 306
S.E.2d 686 (1983) (clause upheld); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Guardian Alarm Co.,
115 Mich. App. 278, 320 N.W.2d 244 (1982) ($250 limitation of liability enforced against
claim of 513,417 loss); New England Watch Corp. v. Honeywell, Inc., 11 Mass. App. Ct. 948,
416 N.E.2d 1010 (1981) (clause upheld); L. Luria & Son, Inc. v. Alarmtec Int'l Corp., 384
So. 2d 947 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (damages limited to six months rental fee against claim
of $135,000 loss); First Fin., 69 II1. App. 3d 413, 388 N.E.2d 17 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979) (a "hold
harmless" provision probably means not even the $500 recovery awarded by the jury); Greene,
100 Misc. 2d 334, 418 N.Y.S.2d 971 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1979) (clause upheld); Central Alarm of
Tucson v. Ganem, 116 Ariz. 74, 567 P.2d 1203 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1977) (damages limited to six
months rental fee against claim of $17,044 loss); Public Serv. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Royal Burglar
& Fire Alarm, Inc., 90 Misc. 2d 517, 394 N.Y.S.2d 524 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1977) (clause upheld).
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court sympathetic to a non-English speaking immigrant plaintiff
with a $10,000 loss in his first business venture, "[u]nfortunately,
this court is restricted by the uniformity of decisions. '141
This alarm company clause raises the serious issue of causation.
It is quite proper to point out that the alarm system is a link, but
sometimes a minor link, in the damage chain alleged by the plain-
tiffs. If one can rely upon the police department to respond quickly,
if it is fair to speculate that the property will be recovered or that the
fire will be put out when the alarm goes off, then the actual role of
the alarm company takes on more significance. Obnoxious as it may
be, an alarm company's poor response is really only a minor compo-
nent in causation when viewed in the context of current police and
fire systems. Accordingly, the vitality of the exculpatory clause seems
justified. 42
What happens when one party simply assumes the risk of lia-
bility? Typically, such situations involve instances where the actors
are "thrill seekers."
Despite the homage Americans pay to those who risk their lives
in physical adventure, society is reluctant to grant blanket immunity
to the actors for any untoward consequences.148 If a high wire acro-
bat falls and suffers serious injury, the audience will be shocked but
unwilling to compensate the acrobat on negligence grounds. In a
sense, this assumption of total liability is the deal performers make
when they agree to perform at their "own risk." Accordingly, those
who parachute from airplanes, drive fast racing cars, or climb moun-
But see Randall, 516 F. Supp. 1122 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (limitation of liability unenforce-
able when jury determines there is gross negligence); A & Z, 90 A.D.2d at 803, 455 N.Y.S.2d
at 675 (bargain problem precluded enforcement, and placement made it probable that it would
escape attention); Abel Holding Co. v. American Dist. Tel. Co., 147 N.J. Super. 263, 371
A.2d 111 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1977) (failure of an alarm was due to pre-existing
manually caused defect and therefore a tort was not covered by the clause).
140. Todd, 467 F. Supp. at 1298.
141. Chami, 106 Misc. 2d 559, 561, 434 N.Y.S.2d 330, 332 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1980).
142. The alarm contracts may more properly be characterized as including limitation of
damages clauses rather than exculpatory clauses. See infra notes 208-13 and accompanying
text. Nevertheless, modest amounts of damages in such cases are usually enforced by courts in
the face of enormous losses because the causation concerns are too serious. However, to be
effective, limitations clauses must apply to the event. For example, a S250 limit was held to
take effect only after the installation of the system. Rothstein v. Honeywell, Inc., 519 So. 2d
1020 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
143. In Dunn v. Paducah Int'l Raceway, 599 F. Supp. 612 (W.D. Ky. 1984), where a
race car driver died in an accident during the race, the court upheld the release with very little
discussion of the facts or circumstances of the event. For an overview of this type of clause, see
Note, Shielding Against Future Negligence Liability: The Role of Exculpatory Contract Pro-
visions in Personal Injury Actions, 12 W.S.L.J. 819 (1985).
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tains know or should know that they leap, drive and climb into their
own "black hole" of harmful possibilities. The passive partner in
this adventure, the prospective beneficiary of the exculpatory clause,
also recognizes the many frightful and harmful possibilities and at-
tempts to be excused should the possibilities become reality, even if
"caused" by their own negligence.
The scenario most likely to result in enforcement of an exculpa-
tory clause is presented in Poskozim v. Monnacep.1 4" There, a para-
chutist broke his leg upon impact after his first jump and sued the
company, alleging negligence in approving the boots he brought for
the jump. Would the wrong boots always cause a broken leg? Are
there more causal possibilities to an injury suffered upon landing
than the role of the boots? The court did not ask these questions, but
did deny the claim. Without so stating, it apparently viewed the
plaintiff as having undertaken responsibility for the results of jump-
ing into this particular black hole.
1 45
Simply stated, thrill seekers seem to be on their own where the
possibilities of injury extend beyond the complete and practical con-
trol of the beneficiary of the clause or where the injury occurs as a
result of a combination of actions, some of which are within the con-
trol of the thrill seeker. This line of thinking leads to a "black hole"
theory, which has a rough sort of fairness to commend it. When a
skydiver breaks his leg 146 or falls into a power line, 47 it seems equi-
table to conclude that the actor assumed the risk that such injuries
would occur.
The spillover of this kind of thinking is illustrated in Jones v.
Dressel."I In Dressel, a plaintiff was injured when a plane crashed
shortly after take-off. The Colorado Supreme Court did not find it
144. 131 11. App. 3d 445, 475 N.E.2d 1042 (1985).
145. Plaintiff Poskozim relied upon Diedrich v. Wright, 550 F. Supp. 805, 806 (N.D.
Il. 1982), where the release applied only to "unforeseen and unforeseeable risks and hazards
over which [the defendants] have no control." Poskozim v. Monnacep, 131 I11. App. 3d 445,
448, 475 N.E.2d at 1044 (1985). In Diedrich, the court refused to release defendants from
injuries that resulted from their direct negligence, and not from the dangers of the sport. The
Poskozim court refused to reduce the scope of risk without that specific language before it. The
lesson appears to be that by not pointing out the existence of the "black hole," proponents of
the clause benefit from the judicial willingness to assume its broad reach.
146. Cain v. Cleveland Parachute Training Center, 9 Ohio App. 3d 27, 457 N.E.2d
1185 (1983).
147. Id. But see Gross, 49 N.Y.2d 102, 400 N.E.2d 306, 424 N.Y.S.2d 365 (1979)
(clause not enforced due to concern about language used).
148. 623 P.2d 370 (Colo. 1981). Plaintiff first signed the clause while a minor, but the
court held that he had ratified it by subsequent jumps after turning eighteen years of age. For
a critique of this decision, see Note, Exculpatory Clauses and Public Policy: A Judicial Di-
lemma, 53 U. COLO. L. REV. 793 (1982).
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necessary to consider plaintiff's allegations that the accident occurred
because the plane ran out of gas. Rather, it affirmed the trial court's
summary judgment against the plaintiff. Therefore, the court did not
reach the issue of whether the plaintiff could have successfully
waived the risk that the plane would malfunction due to the negli-
gence of the provider. However, it seems that successful waiver in
such cases is possible, since the risk that the plane may crash is
knowable, within the sole control of the provider, and is one reasona-
ble parties should be unwilling to waive.149
Another example of the extension of black hole analysis is
found in Zimmer v. Mitchell & Ness."' In that case, plaintiff was
injured when his ski binding failed to properly release upon falling.
His suit against the ski rental shop and others for providing defective
equipment was decided against him on summary judgment. The ap-
pellate court held, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court later af-
firmed, that the "Rental Agreement and Receipt" effectively shifted
all responsibility for injury to the plaintiff, despite the absence of the
word "negligence" in the agreement. 5 ' A sharp dissent questioned
the legitimacy of the bargain "' and raised the possibility that the
negligence predated the signing of the agreement. 15 Nevertheless,
the court left plaintiff exactly where he had stepped: into the "black
hole" of both known and unknown danger, where anything can go
wrong.
This "black hole" principle was also applied to participation in
the Peachtree road race, a less obviously dangerous undertaking. In a
particularly tragic accident, a Phi Beta Kappa law student suffered a
form of brain damage when he collapsed during the run, which was
held on July 4th in Atlanta, Georgia. He sued the sponsors of the
race for failure to warn participants of the adverse effects of extreme
heat and for failure to conduct physicals before allowing contestants
to participate in the race. The plaintiff's suit was dismissed despite
149. Compare the reasoning in Adams, 686 S.W.2d 73 (Tenn. 1985), where plaintiff
motorcycle-driver struck a steel photo-electric cell reflector near the finish line. He alleged that
the reflector could and should have been made of more flexible material. The appellate court
reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment and allowed the plaintiff a chance to
prove gross negligence.
150. 253 Pa. Super. 474, 385 A.2d 437 (1978), affd, 490 Pa. 428, 416 A.2d 1010
(1980).
151. Id. at 476, 385 A.2d at 439.
152. The dissenting judge argued that the failure to use the particular word "negligent"
should be fatal to an otherwise enforceable clause. Id. at 480, 385 A.2d. at 442 (Hoffman, J.,
dissenting). See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
153. Zimmer v. Mitchell & Ness, 253 Pa. Super. 474, 481, 385 A.2d 437, 442 (1978).
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the severity of his injury. The court ruled that plaintiff's waiver of
liability on the part of the sponsors was "not contrary to law or
morality.' 1 54 In a sense, the black hole is truly a bottomless pit of
unforeseeable forces, defying a search for causation and consequent
liability for negligence.
The decade's cases provide affirmance of this thrill seeking doc-
trine. A go-kart driver, " ' a doctor practicing rescue maneuvers on
Mt. Rainier,1" a river raft passenger,'157 the survivors of a race-car
driver killed in a collision on the track,"" and a demolition derby
crew member run over by a car' 5 ' were all barred from pursuing
claims because of releases in their contracts. Having stepped into the
realm of danger and obvious risk, these actors encountered courts
unwilling on agreement, power, or policy grounds to rescue them
from their bargains.
Entities that cater to health seekers might hold a middle station
in the black hole. Despite a lack of obvious danger to clients, health
clubs typically employ exculpatory clauses in their contracts. These
contracts are often negotiated as part of an extended introduction to
the club. Although the health spa contract is similar to the specific
and detailed agreement used by alarm companies, it bears a resem-
blance to thrill seeking releases in that the causation concerns under-
lying the exculpatory clause are generally not specified.
In the majority of cases reviewed, exculpatory clauses in health
club contracts were upheld with little discussion.' 6 Nevertheless,
some courts were benevolent toward the actors in health club claims.
Those cases reflected a greater concern with, the bargaining process
and public policy."' In Leidy v. Deseret Enterprises, Inc.,"' for ex-
154. Williams v. Cox Enters., Inc., 159 Ga. App. 333, 335, 283 S.E.2d 367, 369 (1981).
155. Barnes v. New Hampshire Karting Assoc., 128 N.H. 102, 509 A.2d 151 (1986).
156. Blide v. Rainier Mountaineering, Inc., 30 Wash. App. 571, 636 P.2d 492 (1981),
reh'g denied, 96 Wash. 2d 1027 (1982).
157. Franzek v. Calspan Corp., 78 A.D.2d 134, 434 N.Y.S.2d 288 (1980).
158. Dunn v. Paducah Int'l Raceway, 599 F. Supp. 612 (W.D. Ky. 1984).
159. La Frenz, 172 Ind. App. 389, 360 N.E.2d 605 (1977).
160. See, e.g., Lovelace v. Figure Salon, Inc., 179 Ga. App. 51, 345 S.E.2d 139 (1986)
(injury sustained while strengthening leg muscles in preparation for surgery); Schlobohm, 326
N.W.2d 920 (Minn. 1982) (plaintiff aggravated a pre-existing back injury on leg-extension
machine); Petry, 641 S.W.2d 202 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1982) (back injury caused by collapse of
exercise machine); Kubisen v. Chicago Health Clubs, 69 Ill. App. 3d 463, 388 N.E.2d 44
(1979) (plaintiff failed to assert unawareness of clause). In each instance, the bargaining pro-
cess and policy concerns were found fair and fulfilled.
161. In Schlobohm, both the bargaining process and public interest concerns were ad-
dressed in detail. "Before signing the membership contract, [plaintiff] had the opportunity and
did 'somewhat' read the context of the contract." Schlobohm, 326 N.W.2d at 922. The court
found no ambiguity, no disparity of bargaining power, and no application of the Tunki policy
concerns. Id. at 922-25.
162. 252 Pa. Super. 162, 381 A.2d 164 (1977).
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ample, a woman who was treated at a spa upon a referral by her
physician suffered injuries because the treatment given was the op-
posite of that requested. In refusing to enforce the exculpatory clause
in the spa's contract, the court drew an analogy between a statutory
licensing scheme for physical therapists and the activities carried out
by the spa. The court also mentioned the underlying public policy of
promoting a therapeutic relationship between health clubs and their
patrons. '
Although the "black hole" theory of causation helps explain the
vitality of the exculpatory clause, exceptions to the doctrine exist
where public policy concerns are strong. These concerns often lead to
the denial of exculpatory clause enforcement. For example, although
the court in Sexton v. Southwestern Auto Racing Assoc., Inc.," 4 ac-
knowledged a policy of enforcing assumption of risk agreements, it
nevertheless required close scrutiny of the bargain between a pitman
and the racing association. In this case, the circumstances surround-
ing the contract and the possibility of misrepresentation were impor-
tant factors because the pitman, who was injured when a racecar
crashed through barriers at a track, may not have understood that he
was signing a release of liability."" Similarly, an exculpatory clause
was not enforced against a child injured in a stampede of horses on a
trail ride at Disneyworld because the clause was ambiguous. " Ac-
cording to the court, there was a "complete absence of any language
indicating the intent to either release or indemnify the defendant for
its own negligence." '
Exculpatory clauses thus enjoy a certain vitality when invoked
by those serving the thrill seekers of this country. Although judges
can scrutinize the transaction itself, the bargaining position of the
parties, and certain public policy concerns, they rarely do. Instead,
the participatory nature of the subject matter involved in the agree-
ment and the vast number of potential hazards provide sufficient jus-
tification for courts to allow the parties to allocate their own risks
among themselves.
163. Some states have invalidated exculpatory clauses in health clubs by statute. See,
e.g., N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-326 (McKinney 1978).
164. 75 111. App. 3d 388, 394 N.E.2d 49 (1979).
165. Id. at 389, 394 N.E.2d at 50-51.
166. O'Connell, 413 So. 2d 444 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
167. Id. at 447.
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C. Other Rationalizations
Structurally, exculpatory clauses are contractual provisions that
create or deny certain rights. Exculpatory clauses are treated here as
establishing the freedom to commit negligence while performing a
contract. Yet, the legal system characterizes some clauses of an excul-
patory nature by other legal means. Such clauses are recognized by a
variety of legal terms. For instance, the law of sales, with its reper-
toire of disclaimers, liquidated damages, and limitation of reme-
dies,"68 gives substance and respectability to exculpation. Further,
certain occupational situations can be made more conducive to the
recognition of exculpatory clauses when the facts of these cases are
framed in certain specified terms."' Included in the latter group are
the construction industry's "no damage for delay" clauses, commer-
cial allocation situations, 70 and clauses benefiting from policies
carved out of regulated or semi-regulated industries. We offer here
the thesis that exculpatory clauses have more vitality when framed in
one of these contexts.
1. No Damage for Delay
A disclaimer is a renunciation of a right. Disclaimers can ap-
pear in varying legal forms. For example, the practice in the con-
struction industry of inserting "no damage for delay" clauses in con-
tracts is, in effect, a disclaimer for the offense of delay.
17 1
General attempts to excuse substandard behavior contemplate
168. See, e.g., S. M. Wilson & Co. v. Smith Int'l, Inc., 587 F.2d 1363 (9th Cir. 1978), a
typical limitation of remedy case where the contractual provision was effective against the
buyer of a tunnel-boring machine. In the case of a bank permitting their customer's wife
unauthorized access to a safety deposit box, a limitation excusing liability "unless gross negli-
gence, fraud, or bad faith" was effective and distinguishable from other state law in that it was
not a "full" exculpatory clause. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Carre, 436 So. 2d 227 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1983), petition denied, 444 So. 2d 416 (Fla. 1984).
169. There is also a downside risk in using other theories. In Hall v. Skate Escape,
Ltd., 171 Ga. App. 178, 319 S.E.2d 67 (1986), for example, a customer was injured while
using rented skates. He characterized the problem as a bailment situation. The bailment argu-
ment diluted the effect of the clause because Georgia statutory public policy regarding bail-
ments requires the lessor to warrant "that the thing bailed is free from any secret fault." Id. at
179, 319 S.E.2d at 69 (citing GA. CODE ANN. § 44-12-63).
170. For example, in enforcing a waiver of subrogation clause in a contract for the
purchase of a prepackaged home, the court noted that the waiver was "not even a true excul-
patory clause," as the parties really agreed "to shift most of the risk . . . to a third party,
namely [plaintiff's] insurance company." Bastian v. Wausau Homes, Inc., 635 F. Supp. 201,
203 (N.D. I11. 1986).
171. For an excellent review of these clauses, see Lesser, The Validity, Force and Effect
of No Damage for Delay Clauses, 62 FLA. B.J. 21 (1988).
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absolution for an infinite number of negative effects. Unlike these,
the language of no damage for delay clauses pleads for immunity
from a particular type of behavior. A typical no damage for delay
clause reads:
The Contractor agrees to make no claim for damages for delay
in the performance of this contract occasioned by any act or
omission to act of the City or any of its representatives, and
agrees that any such claim shall be fully compensated for by an
extension of time to complete performance of the work as pro-
vided herein."'
No damage for delay clauses are common to the building indus-
try. As such they are governed by principles suited to the problems
for which they are created. For instance, in Kalisch-Jarco, Inc. v.
City of New York, 7 ' a heating contractor who was the successful
bidder under an eight-million dollar contract involving the construc-
tion of New York police headquarters sued to recover delay damages
from the City. The above quoted clause was the contractor's princi-
pal barrier to relief. The contractor attributed the delay solely "to
the city's 'endless' revisions of scores of plans and drawings, to its
failure to co-ordinate the activities of its prime contractors, and to
other acts of omission or commission interfering with the sequence
and timing of the work.' ' 7 4
The New York Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's
award of nearly one-million dollars to the heating contractor. The
court's majority ruled that the jury must find something more than
the defendant's active interference17 5 in the performance of the con-
tract to award damages. The court also held that a party's passive or
active conduct does not determine wrongdoing. Consulting a diction-
ary, the majority stated that the plain meaning of "interference" and
its synonym, "intervention", do not "connote willfulness, malicious-
ness, abandonment, [or] bad faith.' 1 7' Hence, a no damage for delay
172. Kalisch-Jarco, Inc. v. City of New York, 58 N.Y.2d 377, 380, 448 N.E.2d 413,
414, 461 N.Y.S.2d 746, 747 (1983).
173. 58 N.Y.2d 377, 448 N.E.2d 413, 461 N.Y.S.2d 746 (1983).
174. Id. at 381, 448 N.E.2d at 414, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 747. In delay law, this defense is
sometimes called "active interference." "Active interference is merely one of the several expres-
sions which courts have used in discussing a broad range of willful wrongdoing beyond the
sufferance of an exculpatory clause." Id. at 386 n.7, 448 N.E.2d at 417 n.7, 461 N.Y.S.2d at
750 n.7. Revisions of a contract by the owner qualify as active interference. A strong dissent in
A & M, 135 Cal. App. 3d 473, 186 Cal. Rptr. 114 (1982), outlines how revisions should be
classified.
175. Kalish-Jarco, 58 N.Y.2d at 386, 448 N.E.2d at 417, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 750.
176. Id.
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clause would survive unless there was evidence that the City "acted
in bad faith and with deliberate intent delayed the plaintiff in the
performance of its obligation.""'
The no damage for delay clause seems to be particularly dura-
ble.' 8 Of the seven cases reviewed, the clause was only struck down
in one instance for technical reasons 79 and in another upon a show-
ing of active interference.'8 The vitality of the clause derives its ra-
tionale both from economics and from the belief that the parties are
mature players able to take care of themselves. No damage for delay
provisions are part of the economic package upon which the parties
agree. The contractor who chooses to accept these risks will reflect
the accompanying responsibility in his price. 8 '
2. Allocation of Risk
The emphasis on economics in cases involving no damage for
delay clauses is a recognition that the allocation of risk is the under-
lying purpose of all contracts. Partners adjusting the allocation of
risk provide a good illustration of this principle.' 2 Also, parties who
contemplate negligence usually designate responsibility for insurance
coverage in the contract.
Public policy arguments against the enforcement of exculpatory
clauses appear muted against a backdrop of insurance coverage is-
sues. 8 An issue of subrogation usually triggers a policy argument.
177. Id. at 386, 448 N.E.2d at 418, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 751. In Corinno Civetta Constr.
Corp. v. New York, 67 N.Y.2d 297, 299, 493 N.E.2d 905, 907, 502 N.Y.S.2d 681, 683
(1986), the contract clauses covered a broad range of reasonable and unreasonable conduct but
could not excuse behavior that "smacks of intentional wrongdoing."
178. The clause was upheld in Corinno, 67 N.Y.2d at 297, 493 N.E.2d at 905, 502
N.Y.S.2d at 681; Novak & Co. v. New York City Hous. Auth., 125 Misc. 2d 647, 480
N.Y.S.2d 403 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1984); John E. Green Plumbing & Heating, Inc. v. Turner
Constr. Co., 742 F.2d 965 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1102 (1985); Broadway
Maintenance Corp. v. Rutgers, State Univ. 90 N.J. 253, 447 A.2d 906 (N.J. 1982).
179. Shintech, Inc. v. Group Constructors, Inc., 688 S.W.2d 144 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985),
where there appeared to be conflicting clauses.
180. Phoenix Contractors, Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 135 Mich. App. 787, 355
N.W.2d 673 (1984), where there was no delay per se, but substantial extra cost to the heating
and plumbing subcontractor due to active interference.
181. Broadway, 90 N.J. at 270, 447 A.2d at 914.
182. 628 Harvard Assocs. v. Pensacola Warehouse, Ltd., 483 So. 2d 132 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1986), where the contractual limitation of liability among limited partners was upheld.
183. See, e.g., Board of Educ., 46 N.Y.2d 653, 389 N.E.2d 798, 416 N.Y.S.2d 202
(1979), where a property owner lost even though New York public policy voids contracts
attempting to limit liability resulting from negligence in real property situations. In Fairchild
for Use and Benefit of State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. W.O. Taylor Commercial Refriger-
ation & Electric Co., 403 So. 2d 1119 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981), the court found that al-
though the parties could bargain for and shift the risk of loss, they could not make the provi-
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In South Tippecanoe School Bldg. Corp. v. Shambaugh & Son,
Inc.,184 for example, an insurance company, as subrogee to the land
owner, attempted to hold the contractor liable for losses resulting
from a gas explosion and fire at the construction site. The contract
provision requiring the owner to procure insurance relieved the con-
tractor of liability for its negligence. Likewise, in Insurance Com-
pany of North America v. Avis Rent-A-Car System, Inc.,185 the issue
was whether and to what extent insurance coverage can serve as a
source of indemnification for financial loss resulting from negligent
operation of a rental car. Once the insured's beneficiaries were com-
pensated by the owner of the rental car, the parties (owner, lessee,
and insurer) could contract among themselves to shift the burden of
loss.
3. Regulated Industries
Many lawyers remember the old railroad hypothetical from law
school days. It went something like this:
Central Railroad operated wood burning locomotives. They also
built and leased wooden structures for warehouse purposes.
These warehouses were located next to the tracks. Sometimes
the warehouses would be set on fire by sparks from the locomo-
tives. The contents of the warehouse were also destroyed. The
lease contained a clause which would, among other things, "in-
demnify and save harmless the lessor as a result of fire, regard-
less of the lessor's negligence."
Because necessity required warehouses to be situated near the zone
of risk, the clause was valid as a proper assumption of risk by the
commercial tenant. 186
Whether the same assumption of risk rationale can be applied
to other railway activities is not evident from cases decided during
the last decade. None of the five railroad-related cases reviewed in-
volved fire-breathing engines.18 A tenant in Graham v. Chicago
sion obscure and indefinite.
184. 182 Ind. App. 350, 395 N.E.2d 320 (1979).
185. 348 So. 2d 1149 (Fla. Sup. Ct. 1977).
186. This rationale was recently expressed in Alabama Great S. R.R. v. Sumter Ply-
wood Corp., 359 So. 2d 1140, 1145 (Ala. 1978), where the Alabama Supreme Court noted the
long history of upholding clauses in agreements between railroad companies and their lessees
that exempted railroads from liability due to fire damage caused by sparks.
187. In one case, Illinois Cent. Gulf R.R. v. Pargas, Inc., 722 F.2d 253 (5th Cir. 1984),
the railroad was only a third party in a case where a clause disclaiming liability for all conse-
quential damages was upheld. The railroad suffered damages when a tank car leaked liquified
petroleum gas on the tracks.
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Rock Island & Pacific R.R.'88 sued the railroad for damages to a
building caused by a derailed train. In Caribbean Produce Ex-
change, Inc. v. Sea Land Service, Inc.'"9 a shipper successfully sued
a railroad for the loss of tomatoes caused by an atmosphere control
problem in the railcars. 90 The tenant survived a motion for sum-
mary judgment and the tomato shipper benefitted from a tariff im-
posed on the industry. The defendant in Lamoille Grain Co. v. St.
Johnsbury & Lamoille County Rail Road'9' successfully pleaded
that an exculpatory clause barred a claim of negligence in a derail-
ment that toppled several grain storage bins. A clause was not suc-
cessful, however, in Alabama Great Southern Rail Road v. Sumter
Plywood Corp."' where damage to drop-bin loaders on a siding re-
sulted from a railroad employee's failure to notice that a railroad car
was attached to the bin when it was moved. The salient fact in Ala-
bama Great Southern was the plaintiff's lease of property to an en-
tity other than the railroad. Thus, the case was "not incident to an
ownership of land by [the railroad]; by lease or otherwise."'' It
should be noted that the case was overruled to the extent that it ex-
pressed a philosophical disapproval of exculpatory clauses in
Alabama."'
Bargains made with regulated industries are sometimes outlined
by the government. For example, the master contract in a utility
franchise, the tariff, may protect the utility by limiting the amount
and type of liability for damages caused by the utility.' 95 The tariff
was successful in a power outage case,' 96 but not in a water com-
pany case' 97 where business property owners charged that there was
insufficient water pressure to extinguish a fire. In the latter instance,
188. 431 F. Supp. 444 (W.D. Okla. 1976).
189. 415 F. Supp. 88 (D.C.P.R. 1976).
190. Unless a consignee receives some consideration for a limitations clause, such as a
change in rates, the clause will not hold. In this instance the shipper paid the higher rate. Id.
at 94.
191. 135 Vt. 5, 369 A.2d 1839 (1976).
192. 359 So. 2d 1140 (Ala. 1978).
193. Id. at 1146.
194. Industrial Tile, Inc. v. Stewart, 388 So. 2d 171, 176 (Ala. 1980).
195. Power and light companies, for example, are generally not liable for the loss of
food in a freezer where power is interrupted, regardless of the reason for the failure. Consoli-
dated Edison successfully used the limitations of liability set forth in the rate schedule filed
with the public service commission in Lee v. Consolidated Edison Co. of New York, 98 Misc.
2d 304, 413 N.Y.S.2d 826 (N.Y. App. Term. 1978) where outage damages were charged. The
limitation was enforced even though "customers are not afforded the opportunity to purchase
greater liability protection at increased rates." Id. at 306, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 828.
196. Id. at 304, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 826.
197. De Francesco, 329 Pa. Super. 508, 478 A.2d 1295 (1984).
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the court viewed the clause excusing the water company for "any
loss or damage for any deficiency in the pressure, volume, or supply
of water due to any cause"'" 8 to be void as against public policy. Not
only was the company in the best position to reduce the risk, but the
customer was unaware of the clause.' 99
Exculpatory clauses fared better in cases involving the yellow
pages from telephone books. Although telephone companies are reg-
ulated, the publication of advertising is not. 00 Nevertheless, publish-
ers appear to be beneficiaries of the protection given to the regulated
arm of their operations. Of the five cases reviewed, would-be adver-
tisers withstood exculpatory clauses only when there was evidence of
fraud. For example, in Morgan v. South Central Bell Telephone
Co., °5 the plaintiff periodontist recovered when the telephone com-
pany failed to list his business four times in succession and never
properly informed plaintiff that a written contract was necessary for
advertisement. However, a doctor of osteopathy,"°2 an engineering
firm,203 and a business customer 0 4 all lost in their quests for dam-
ages resulting from their exclusion from the yellow pages listings.
The exculpatory language of the various clauses contested insulated
the telephone companies from liability, despite judicial appreciation
of the fact that the "yellow pages are a unique advertising device for
which there is no practical substitute. 205
4. Sales Exculpatory Techniques
Exculpatory thought is institutionalized through codification in
the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC). The full weaponry of legal
excuse, including disclaimers, liquidated damages and limitations of
remedy provision, is available to the thoughtful buyer or seller of
goods within the UCC. In a broad sense, these statutory rules
198. Id. at 515, 478 A.2d at 1306.
199. See also John's Pass, 369 So. 2d at 618, where the lessor of a boat dock was not
immunized from liability for damage caused by fire because he had neglected to provide proper
equipment, which was negligence per se.
200. McClure, 101 I1. App. 3d at 1112, 428 N.E.2d at 1154.
201. 466 So. 2d at 111.
202. Richard A. Berjian, D.O., Inc. v. Ohio Bell Tel. Co., 54 Ohio St. 2d 147, 375
N.E.2d 410 (1978).
203. McClure, 101 Ill. App. 3d at 1109, 428 N.E.2d at 1151.
204. Louisville Bear Safety Serv., Inc. v. South Cent. Bell Tel. Co., 571 S.W.2d 438
(Ky. Ct. App. 1978).
205. Id. at 439. Consistent with the exculpatory nature of the limitations clause, plain-
tiff's claim for $26,440 in compensatory damages and $100,000 in punitive damages was re-
duced to an award of $1,440, the cost of the ad.
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breathe vitality into excuse by reason of the UCC's precise treatment
of exculpatory language. A simple example establishes the necessary
background.
Assume that a merchant seller contracts to supply 1,000 baby
chicks to a chicken farmer. The farmer has made known to the seller
that the chicks are necessary to meet an existing supply commitment.
The seller assures the farmer that the chicks will meet his needs. It
turns out that the chicks suffer from bird cancer and soon die. Under
the UCC's implied warranty of merchantability provision,2"6 the
seller has breached his contract to sell healthy birds. He is liable for
this breach. 10 7 The damages recoverable by the buyer may include
consequential or special damages flowing from the buyer's contract
with a third party.
If the seller wishes to excuse his failure to deliver healthy birds
by contract, he must make certain determinations when contracting
under the UCC. For example, he could verbally refuse to promise to
deliver healthy birds under the UCC's implied warranty of
merchantability provision. However, such an action would hardly be
a good business tactic. So, the seller would probably promise to de-
liver healthy chicks, restricting his potential liability by negotiating a
limitation of remedy provision or a liquidated damages clause. Either
of these devices could bar, or limit, the buyer's recovery of damages
resulting from any loss suffered. The UCC orchestrates the Seller's
action through several sections.
Section 2-718(1). Damages for breach by either party may be
liquidated in the agreement but only at an amount which is
reasonable in the light of the anticipated or actual harm caused
by the breach, the difficulties of proof of loss, and the inconve-
nience or infeasibility of otherwise obtaining an adequate
remedy.
Section 2-719(1)(a): [Tjhe agreement may provide for remedies
in addition to or in substitution for those provided in this Article
and may limit or alter the measure of damages recoverable
under this Article, as by limiting the buyer's remedies to return
of the goods and repayment of the price or to repair and re-
placement of non-conforming goods or parts.
Section 2-719(3). Consequential damages may be limited or ex-
cluded unless the limitation or exclusion is unconscionable.
The UCC polices limitation practices through various methods.
206. U.C.C. § 2-314 (1978).
207. Vasles v. Montgomery Ward and Co., 377 F.2d 846 (3d Cir. 1967).
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Disclaimers,2 0 8 for example, must be negotiated. and structured
rather precisely.2 10 The language must be specific and its manifesta-
tion conspicuous. 211 The limitation of remedies provision 1 2 faces the
specific tests of unconscionability and review as to whether circum-
stances cause an exclusive or limited remedy to "fail of its essential
purpose. "213
UCC cases illustrate the complexity of the UCC policing pro-
cess. In Posttape Assoc. v. Eastman Kodak Co.,214 a movie producer
purchased 105 four hundred foot rolls of Ektachrome film for a
movie. The shooting took two-and-one-half days. When the film was
processed it showed scratches. Apparently, the film was negligently
manufactured. The film producer sued Kodak and was awarded
$143,000 at trial, despite the fact that the contract contained a clause
limiting the recovery of damages to the replacement of the film. The
208. A distributor's action against a manufacturer for indemnification for a defective
product sold to a customer was not allowed because of the warranty disclaimer. Thermo King
Corp. v. Strick Corp., 467 F. Supp. 75, aff'd, 609 F.2d 503 (3d Cir. 1979).
209. In Tokio Marine & Fire Ins. Co. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 617 F.2d 936 (2d
Cir. 1980), an airline purchased an airplane under a contract waiving all liability caused by
the seller's negligence. The plane crashed in Moscow, killing fifty-two persons. The apparent
cause of the crash was the absence of a "spoiler system" to bring the plane to a halt. The
disclaimer was enforced among the insurers. In Marr Enters., Inc. v. Lewis Refrigeration Co.,
556 F.2d 951 (9th Cir. 1977), the owner and lessee of a fishing vessel was unsuccessful against
the seller of a refrigeration system installed to combat bacteria growth.
210. In deciding a risk of loss clause in American Empire Ins. Co. v. Koenig Fuel &
Supply Co., 113 Mich. App. 496, 317 N.W.2d 335 (1982), the court held that the U.C.C. still
requires specific disclaimer language. The loss of 10,000 tons of coal due to a fire negligently
caused was not excused by an attempted disclaimer that "we will not be responsible for loss
due to fire or theft." Id. at 498, 317 N.W.2d at 336.
211. Atlas Mut. Ins. Co. v. Moore Dry Kiln Co., 38 Or. App. 111, 589 P.2d 1134
(1979) (fire damages recovery, as between insurer as subrogee of sawmill, was limited and the
disclaimer effective because the language was in bold face and conspicuous).
212. In Cash v. Armco Steel Corp., 462 F. Supp. 272 (N.D. Ga. 1978), a pipe manu-
facturer was sued when a dam failed. The limitation of remedy provision barred the contract
claim for consequential damages. However, the plaintiff tried a tort claim and was permitted
to proceed, the court stating that "the contract must be clear and unequivocal in its warning
that the buyer thereby waives his common law right to recover any damages which might
result from the seller's negligence, even in a commercial context." Id. at 276.
213. U.C.C. § 2-719(2) (1978). See, e.g., Mostek Corp. v. Chemetron Corp., 642
S.W.2d 20 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982), a products liability case in which the buyer of nitrogen sued
the seller on theories of breach of warranty, negligence, and strict liability in tort when the
buyer's plant had to be closed down due to the contaminated product. The limitation of reme-
dies clause was generally found effective as to the warranty and negligence claim. Id. at 25.
However, it was not found effective against the strict tort claim. Note the court's provision: "If,
however, [plaintiff] is able on remand to establish that the limitation of remedy failed of its
essential purpose, [plaintiff] should be allowed recovery for breach of warranty as provided in
the Illinois Commercial Code." Id. at 27.
214. 537 F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1976).
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appellate court reversed, sending to the jury the issue of whether the
practice of restricting a remedy to "replacement only" was a trade
custom.15 The jury answered in the affirmative, finding also that the
limitation of remedy did not fail of its essential purpose and was not
unconscionable. Interestingly, the appellate court viewed the excul-
patory nature of this latter finding as involving distinguishable parts:
We note at the outset that defendant does not seek complete
exculpation, but instead desires to limit plaintiff's recovery.
Though it is possible that an agreement setting damages at a
nominal level may have the practical effect of avoiding almost
all culpability for wrongful action, the differences between the
two concepts is nevertheless a real one.2"
The UCC's unconscionability section, 2-302, appears to act as
surrogate for the common law principles here discussed. Under this
section, one need not charge gross negligence, intentional tort, failure
of the language of the clause, or the like in order to recover.
The exculpatory policies of general law appear to be subsumed
in the developing UCC law on unconscionability. However, the
UCC provisions track the result, if not the technique, of the old
principles. For example, in A & M Produce Co v. FMC Corp."" the
court expressed the anti-exculpatory feeling evident in the operation
of UCC principles by describing the parties as an "enormous diver-
sified corporation and a relatively small but experienced farming
company."2 ' The farming company had purchased from FMC a
weight sizing machine that did not work properly. The company
sued FMC and was awarded a considerable sum. The issue on ap-
peal was whether a purported disclaimer of warranties and a limita-
tion on the buyer's ability to recover consequential damages were
effective. O
The court chose to use the UCC unconscionability doctrine.220
It struck down both the disclaimer clause and the consequential
damage clause despite a finding that the seller could show technical
compliance with requirements of the UCC section governing exclu-
sion or modification of warranties. A review of the totality of the
215. Id. at 758.
216. Id. at 755.
217. 135 Cal. App. 3d 473, 186 Cal. Rptr. 114 (1982).
218. Id. at 489, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 124.
219. Id. at 482-84, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 119-20 (citing and discussing U.C.C. § 2-719). See
supra notes 208-13 and accompanying text, and U.C.C. § 2-302 (the unconscionability provi-
sion of the U.C.C.).
220. A & M, 135 Cal. App. 3d at 482, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 119.
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circumstances by the court included the business environment within
which the contract was executed. The court concluded that when
non-negotiable terms on preprinted form agreements combine with
disparate bargaining power, resulting in the allocation of commercial
risks in a socially or economically unreasonable manner, the concept
of unconscionability as codified furnishes legal justification for refus-
ing enforcement of the offensive result. 2 1 The opinion offers strong
support for the view that, although the viability of exculpatory
clauses depends on technical compliance, unconscionability principles
may offer a different and superior result in reference to the totality
of the bargain.222
Some patterns of commercial activity benefit from the particular
legal techniques noted in this section. Liquidated damages clauses
have a considerable history of acceptance in certain aspects of the
construction industry and in the alarm and security business. 2 The
insurance industry recognizes allocation of risk doctrines, and excul-
patory clauses have genuine vitality in regulated industries. Finally,
the law of sales has incorporated the exculpatory clause into its over-
all scheme.
III. CONCLUSION
Having examined the range of cases concerning exculpatory
clauses, several questions present themselves. Are the issues as sim-
ple as Pilate's? No. Are exculpatory clauses alive and well? Yes, but
with a delicate nature. Was Corbin's test or the Tunkl formula actu-
ally used by the judges? Yes, but only in a few cases. Can the propo-
nent of the clause improve the odds of its being enforced? Yes.
In nearly 55% of the cases reviewed, exculpatory clauses were
approved by courts. Thus, it seems accurate to say that a majority of
courts support exculpatory clauses, although their status is undenia-
bly fragile. The standard for enforcement suggested by Corbin, 24
221. Id. at 493, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 126.
222. Although the disclaimer was conspicuous, its terms did not immediately attract at-
tention. Further, even if there were no unfair surprise, "there is ample evidence of unequal
bargaining power here and a lack of any real negotiation over the terms of the contract." Id. at
492, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 125.
223. The burglar alarm business apparently utilizes all three species of exculpation.
While there is an occasional true attempt at exculpation, such as in Allendale Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Leaseway Warehouse, Inc., 624 F. Supp. 637 (N.D. III. 1985), more generally they are mani-
fested as liquidated damage clauses, save harmless provisions, and an occasional denial of con-
sequential damages. See supra notes 208-13, their accompanying text, and the discussion di-
rectly previous thereto.
224. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
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requiring an examination of the nature of the service, the propriety
of the bargain and the degree of negligence sought to be excused,
informs but does not permeate the case law. The California Supreme
Court's formula, pronounced in Tunkl, adds certain detail to the in-
quiry. The Tunkl formula has been adopted'as a measure of public
policy by some courts. However, the number of decisions citing ei-
ther Corbin or Tunki in this study was very small-less than five
percent.
The expected contractual benefit of an exculpatory clause-the
shift of liability for negligence-is highly dependent upon judicial
appreciation of both the form and content of the bargain, the rela-
tionship of the parties, and the constraints of statutory and judicial
public policy. But the courts do not seem overly concerned with en-
forcing generally applicable standards. Each case is evaluated on its
facts with concern for what may well be a sense of personal fairness.
The perfect exculpatory clause appeared when the following
circumstances were present. Two (1) "big fellows" (2) bargained
that (3) one would procure insurance covering damages arising from
(4) "negligent" acts over a subject matter where (5) neither the Leg-
islature nor previous courts had condemned the clause on public pol-
icy grounds. Thus, the proponent of an exculpatory clause has cer-
tain avenues to pursue in maximizing the chances that the clause
will be enforced.
The bargain which produces an exculpatory clause must be
even-handed. Presenting the clause in an obvious setting and draw-
ing it in obvious terms lends credibility to the transaction. Using the
word "negligence" and limiting the excused conduct to "ordinary"
failure to use reasonable care seems to enhance judicial willingness
to recognize the freedom to contract. In the same vein, creating the
opportunity to reflect upon the terms of the agreement enhances the
chance for its success. A doctor whose patient agrees to an exculpa-
tory clause on the operating table is in trouble; the doctor's office
would be a much more acceptable venue for bargaining. The pro-
longed introduction to health club facilities and the extended oppor-
tunity to review the health club contract is another example of a
favorable bargaining milieu. Others could perhaps profit by these
models, especially landlords in jurisdictions where exculpatory
clauses in leases have not yet been declared void.
The reach of the excuse should be clear. Defenses to public pol-
icy arguments might include a definition of the expected negligence
with particularity and the characterization of the excused behavior
as "reasonable." Alarm company contracts and recreational arrange-
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ments are instructive in this regard. Identifying the possibility of
"substandard" behavior in advance may also increase the likelihood
that the parties will be seen to have properly and fairly bargained,
since an excuse of negligence is less offensive if mentioned at the
outset. After all, judges are schooled in the notion that contracting is
an exercise in risk allocation, best left to an informed society.
By extension, the causation question offers the proponent of an
exculpatory clause the opportunity to increase its probability for suc-
cess. When the range of forces likely to cause injury is beyond an
individual's control, contractual agreements excusing the proponent's
negligence are well-received. Again, the alarm and recreation cases
stand as successful paradigms. Ensuring that the signor of an excul-
patory clause appreciates the many ways in which he or she can be
injured in a race-car derby or in a health club seems to satisfy the
judicial sense of fairness. The no damage for delay clauses also pro-
vide a valuable lesson in this regard. An employer might behave in
ways that would make an inquiry into the reasonableness of its con-
duct a futile exercise. Therefore, it is important that the range of
causation concerns be clearly explained and well understood.
Obviously, a lawyer will be helpless to avoid statutory public
policy clearly proscribing certain excuses in some transactions. How-
ever, few statutes are so worded. In most cases, the drafter of a
clause will need to read the statute, study the language, identify the
mischief the Legislature intended to restrict, and behave reasonably.
Perhaps the most viable way to ensure the enforcement of an
exculpatory clause is to cast it in judicially approved terms. Dis-
claimers, limitations of remedies, and liquidated damages clauses are
positive legal concepts statutorily embraced by the Uniform Com-
mercial Code. Avoiding naked exculpatory clauses and adopting
these techniques will accomplish the goal of enforcement.
In sum, the drafter of an exculpatory clause can maximize the
possibility that a future court will accept the clause by carefully tai-
loring the circumstances of the bargaining process, the language of
the contract, and the extent of the excuse. If challenged in court, the
proponent of the clause would do well to point to any strong ele-
ments of fairness present in the transaction. The freedom to contract
is also a strong argument which can easily persuade courts, particu-
larly if it is claimed that the freedom should only be abridged by
legislative fiat.
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